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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that government agents believe that Alice and Bob'
are engaged in criminal activity and that communications be-
tween them will yield incriminating evidence of money launder-
ing. As the agents contemplate how to obtain the pair's conversa-
tions from Alice, they may choose among three investigative me-
thods that impose dramatically different procedural hurdles.
Under the government's interpretation of current law, agents
may much more easily obtain the electronic communications
stored by Alice's internet service provider ("ISP") than search her
home for records of their conversations or wiretap her phones to
intercept their calls. 2
According to the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), government
agents may compel ISPs to disclose most stored e-mail messages
without first obtaining a warrant based on a showing of probable
cause and in some cases without even providing notice to the
subscriber. 3 Instead, government agents may merely establish to
a court that they have reason to believe that the electronic mes-
sages they seek are relevant to an ongoing investigation. Accord-
ing to the DOJ, there is no limit on how much information the
ISP must disclose; the government may compel ISPs to disclose a
substantial portion of a customer's e-mail account, even though
the agents obtain no meaningful judicial review before, during,
or after their demand for information.
1 Alice and Bob are archetypal characters frequently used in discussions of cryptog-
raphy and computer security. See, for example, Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography:
Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C 47 (Wiley 2d ed 1996); A. Michael Froomkin,
The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Pa
L Rev 709, 754 (1995).
2 Agents may also choose to intercept e-mails in real time, but to do that they must
follow procedures that are similar to those that regulate the wiretapping of traditional
telephone calls. See, for example, James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia, The Law of Elec-
tronic Surveillance § 1:14 (Thomson West 2007); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:
Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 Ala L Rev 9, 42-73 (2004) (comparing the
procedures for online surveillance to those for wiretapping).
3 We discuss the government's approach to various categories of e-mail in Part I A.
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If agents had instead sought a search warrant to obtain Al-
ice's e-mails from her home, they would have had first to per-
suade a judge that they had probable cause to believe that the
search would yield evidence of a crime. 4 To obtain a wiretap on
Alice's phone line, the agents would have had to establish prob-
able cause, demonstrate that there was no less intrusive way to
obtain the information, and satisfy other procedural require-
ments. 5 Both the home search and the wiretap would be subject
to much more penetrating judicial oversight and review, despite
the fact that neither technique is more obviously intrusive. In
fact, it is unlikely that the home search would yield as much evi-
dence of Alice's communications with Bob as the demands for
information from the ISP. Similarly, a wiretap would yield only
those communications that take place after the tap is placed and
would not yield the richness of data available from the ISP's
servers.6
The government has derived support for this oddly disparate
treatment from the provisions of the Stored Communications Act
("SCA"). 7 Congress passed the SCA in 1986 as part of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), which was de-
signed to bring privacy protections to the newly emerging com-
munications media.8 Interestingly, despite the explosion in use
of electronic communications technologies since the SCA's pas-
sage, Congress has not updated its terms or significantly
changed its structure. More fundamentally, until last year, no
Article III court had opined on the constitutionality of the gov-
ernment's compelled disclosures of electronic communications. 9
4 FRCrP 41.
5 See 18 USC §§ 2518(3), (5) (2000).
6 See Brief for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law and Internet Law as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting the Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Warshak v United States, No 06-
4092, *6-7 (6th Cir filed Nov 21, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 4670944)
("Warshak Law Professors' Brief'). We were the authors of the Professors' brief.
7 See Stored Wired and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records
Access, Pub L No 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat 1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 USC
§§ 2701-09, 2711-12).
8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848,
codified in various sections of title 18 (1986).
9 See United States v Ferguson, 508 F Supp 2d 7, 9 (D DC 2007) (noting that, prior
to the district court's ruling in Warshak, no court had ruled the SCA unconstitutional).
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, a non-Article III court, had previously opined
that users generally do have an expectation of privacy in e-mail. See United States v
Long, 64 MJ 57, 64-67 (Ct App Armed Forces 2006) (applying Fourth Amendment prece-
dents outside of the e-mail context to find that defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her e-mails); United States v Maxwell, 45 MJ 406, 418 (Ct App Armed Forces
1996) ("[The transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that po-
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Despite the government's admission that demands for stored e-
mails represent an "important, widely-used tool in criminal in-
vestigations involving fraud, terrorism, child pornography, drug
trafficking, and other crimes,"'10 no court had considered what
constraints, if any, the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures imposes. Because the government
appears to rely heavily on the technique, its unconstitutionality
would mean that the government has been committing innumer-
able constitutional violations.
In June 2007, a federal appellate court finally translated the
benchmark Fourth Amendment standard of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy into the language of stored e-mail. The news
was not good for the government. In Warshak v United States,1
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that sub-
scribers generally enjoy an expectation of privacy in e-mail mes-
sages they store with an ISP, which means that government
agents ordinarily cannot compel providers to disclose those
stored e-mails without first securing a judicial warrant based on
a showing of probable cause. 12 Under the panel's decision, gov-
ernment agents seeking to compel a service provider to disclose
e-mail must acquire a warrant, establish to a court that no war-
rant is needed because the target lacks an expectation of privacy
in the e-mails sought, or provide to the target notice and an op-
portunity to be heard.13 The Court thus invalidated the SCA to
the extent that it permits access to stored e-mails without adher-
ence to these procedures.
The Sixth Circuit reheard the case en banc in December
2007, after having vacated the panel's decision. 14 The en banc
court recently issued a decision in which it vacated the prelimi-
nary injunction because it found Warshak's claim not ripe for
lice officials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search
warrant.... The sender enjoys a reasonable expectation that the initial transmission will
not be intercepted by the police.").
10 See Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, Warshak v United States,
No 06-4092, *1 (6th Cir filed Aug 1, 2007), available at <http://volokh.comfileslWarshak-
en-banc-petition.pdf> (last visited Apr 11, 2008) ("Government En Banc Petition").
11 490 F3d 455 (6th Cir 2007), vacd and rehg en banc granted, 2007 US App LEXIS
23741 (6th Cir Oct 9, 2007).
12 Warshak, 490 F3d at 473 ("[W]e have little difficulty agreeing with the district
court that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails that
are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP.').
13 See id at 475-76, 482. We discuss what issues the target should be able to raise in
such a hearing in Part III D 2.
14 Order, Warshak v United States, No 06-4092, 2007 US App LEXIS 23741, *1-2
(6th Cir Oct 9, 2007) (ordering rehearing en banc and vacating panel decision).
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judicial resolution. 15 The court did not address the constitution-
ality of the SCA and the government's practices pursuant to it. 16
Because the en banc court rejected Warshak's claim on proce-
dural grounds, whether the Fourth Amendment permits gov-
ernment agents to compel disclosure of stored e-mail without a
warrant or an applicable exception will persist as a pressing
question. As the only available analysis of the question by an
Article III court, the Sixth Circuit's panel decision deserves close
scrutiny. 17 Moreover, in the short period between the time it was
issued and when it was vacated, Warshak's reasoning proved
influential in several cases involving communications surveil-
lance practices. '8
In this Article, we argue that the panel got it right when it
found that e-mail users generally retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the e-mails stored on their ISPs' computers. Gov-
ernment agents' invasion of that reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
agents ordinarily cannot proceed with a search without first ob-
taining a warrant from a neutral magistrate based on a showing
of probable cause. According meaningful judicial oversight to the
compelled disclosure of stored e-mails brings the regulation of
modern surveillance practices in line with traditional methods
such as wiretapping and searching and seizing traditional let-
ters. It also appropriately recognizes the vital nature of e-mail
15 Warshak v United States, 532 F3d 521 (6th Cir 2008) (en banc).
16 The decision indicated that the en banc court viewed the question of whether the
target entertains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his stored e-mail to be quite fact
specific, and to depend, in some fashion, on the nature of the ISP's contract and relation-
ship with the target. Id at 526-28. That view is fairly close to the panel's approach, and
so we do not separately analyze it. We explain our disagreement with this approach in
Part III D.
17 One prominent academic commentator on surveillance issues called the panel's
decision "simply wrong." See Brief of Amicus Curiae Orin S. Kerr in Favor of the Petition
of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, Warshak v United States, No 06-4092, *9
(6th Cir tendered Aug 9, 2007), available at <http://volokh.com/files/warshakamicus.pdf>
(last visited Apr 11, 2008) ("Kerr Brief for Rehearing"). See also Orin Kerr, A Series of
Posts on Warshak v United States, the E-Mail Privacy Case, The Volokh Conspiracy
(June 18, 2007), available at <http://volokh.com/posts/chainl182181742.shtml> (last
visited Apr 11, 2008) (calling the panel's decision "astonishing" and "troubling").
18 See, for example, United States v D'Andrea, 497 F Supp 2d 117, 121-22 (D Mass
2007) (relying on Warshak's analysis that a user assumes the risk of losing the expecta-
tion of privacy when sharing information with others, depending upon how such informa-
tion is shared); Platte v Thomas Township, 504 F Supp 2d 227, 239 (E D Mich 2007)
(striking down as unconstitutional under a facial challenge a state statute authorizing
warrantless breath tests); In re United States, 515 F Supp 2d 325, 337-38 (E D NY 2007)
(explaining that under the Warshak standard, telephone users held a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in post-cut-through dialed digits (digits dialed after a telephone call has
commenced)).
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today and the need to rein in government access to it. Not only is
the court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement protects e-mail right, but it has significant salutary
effects on both constitutional and statutory law regarding com-
munications surveillance. It clarifies that electronic communica-
tions are constitutionally private, notwithstanding the necessary
involvement of third parties in their transmission and storage. It
also dramatically simplifies the application of the SCA to new
technologies, which in turn facilitates both compliance by agents
and ISPs and review by courts of that compliance.
In Part I, we briefly review the statutory background, the
Warshak case itself, the government's arguments in support of
its agents' practices, and the panel's response. In Part II, we dis-
cuss how according the same constitutional protection to e-mail
as is afforded to telephone calls and first class letters resolves
concerns about the irrationality of the disparate treatment and
properly assesses users' reasonable expectations of privacy. In
Part III, we consider the government's arguments in greater
depth and conduct a detailed analysis of the precedents. We ar-
gue that courts should not accept the government's invitation to
extend those precedents well beyond their holdings. Instead,
courts should clarify that the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement does play a role in regulating law enforcement access
to our electronic communications, wherever they may be. In Part
IV, we explain how warrant-level protection for stored e-mail
significantly simplifies the application of the SCA and strength-
ens its protections. We conclude with some questions about
whether the Warshak panel went far enough in recognizing
Fourth Amendment protection for stored e-mail.
I. THE WARSHAK DECISION
A. The Legal Framework
To understand the issues at stake in the Warshak case, one
must understand the structure of the SCA and the Department
of Justice's interpretation of it. 19 The SCA establishes procedures
for government access to electronic communications held by ser-
19 The most thorough publicly available version of the Department of Justice's inter-
pretation of the SCA appears in Computer Crime and Intel Prop Sec, Crim Div, DOJ,
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Inves-
tigations, 4-7 (July 2002), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
s&smanual2002.pdf> (last visited Apr 11, 2008) ("DOJ Search Manual").
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vice providers. The statute does not, however, establish uniform
access rules for all stored electronic communications. In Part IV,
we argue that recognizing that the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement protects stored e-mail does lead to a much simpler
and more unified approach, but for now, the government pro-
ceeds as though the warrant requirement does not apply. Though
scholars, including ourselves, have criticized the government's
approach extensively, 20 it appears clear from the government's
arguments in the Warshak case that it views most, if not all,
stored e-mails as not subject to the warrant requirement.
The SCA provides the most protection to communications
that are in "electronic storage" with the provider of an "electronic
communication service" for 180 days or less.21 More specifically,
under 18 USC § 2703(a), government agents seeking to acquire
such communications must obtain a search warrant. A warrant
issues only after a judge finds probable cause to believe that a
specific crime has been, is being, or will be committed and that
the search will yield evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of the
crime. 22 The warrant requirement thus places a neutral magis-
trate between the law enforcement agent and the target of the
investigation. The probable cause finding provides a record of
justification that the target may challenge in court before evi-
dence from the search may be used against him. 23
According to the DOJ's interpretation of it, the SCA does not
require agents to obtain a warrant if they are seeking communi-
cations that are not in "electronic storage" with the provider of
an "electronic communication service" or if they are seeking
communications that remain in storage for more than 180
days.24 Instead, agents can compel disclosure through procedures
that are less protective of the subscriber's interests. First, gov-
ernment investigators can obtain communications by presenting
20 See Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 58-59 (cited in note 2); Patricia L. Bellia, The Mem-
ory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 137, 174-75 (2008); Patricia L. Bellia, Sur-
veillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1375, 1417-26 (2004).
21 18 USC § 2703(a) (2000 & Supp IV 2004).
22 FRCrP 41.
23 The target's ability to challenge the search depends upon the target having been
notified of the search. Standard principles of criminal procedure require such notice.
FRCrP 41. The Justice Department, however, interprets § 2703(a) of the SCA not to re-
quire notice to the target, apparently on the theory that the service provider, rather than
the target, is the searched entity. DOJ Search Manual at 97-99 (cited in note 19). We
return to this issue in Part IV A.
24 See 18 USC § 2703(b) (2000 & Supp IV 2004). Agents can rely on a warrant if they
choose. Here the statute is clear that if agents do use a warrant, they need not provide
prior notice to the subscriber. Id at § 2703(b)(1)(A).
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a special court order issued under § 2703(d) of the SCA.25 To ob-
tain such an order, government agents must present "specific
and articulable facts" demonstrating that the material they seek
is "relevant" to an ongoing criminal investigation 26-a standard
that is lower than probable cause. Second, government investiga-
tors can compel production of communications by presenting a
service provider with a trial subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, or
an administrative subpoena. 27 Subpoenas typically require only
a showing that agents seek information that is "relevant" to an
ongoing criminal investigation, rather than a showing of prob-
able cause that a specific crime is being committed. Moreover,
the government's showing is typically not evaluated by a judge. 28
Because the government's approach accords warrant-level
protection only to those communications held in "electronic stor-
age" by the provider of an "electronic communication service," a
crucial question concerns how to determine which communica-
tions those are. By cross-reference to the federal Wiretap Act, the
SCA defines "electronic storage" to include "temporary, interme-
diate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the transmission thereof' and "any storage of such communica-
tion by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection. ' 29
The Department of Justice has long interpreted the "elec-
tronic storage" definition to cover only communications that have
not yet been accessed by their recipients.30 Once a subscriber
retrieves an e-mail and does not delete it from the provider's sys-
tem, the Justice Department claims, such an e-mail is no longer
25 Id at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii).
26 Id at § 2703(d).
27 Id at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). If investigators rely on a § 2703(d) order or a grand jury or
administrative subpoena rather than a warrant, they generally must provide prior notice
to the subscriber. The SCA also allows the government to compel production of communi-
cations without prior notice to the subscriber if there is "reason to believe that notifica-
tion" will have an "adverse result": endangering the life or physical safety of an individ-
ual; causing flight from prosecution; causing destruction or tampering with evidence;
causing intimidation of potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an inves-
tigation or unduly delaying a trial. In such a case, notice may be delayed by renewable
periods of up to ninety days. 18 USC § 2705 (2000).
28 See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv L Rev 842, 864 (2001) (describing subpoenas as equivalent
to a "blank check"). Trial subpoenas are typically issued by a clerk of court (or in some
cases an attorney); grand jury subpoenas are typically issued by the clerk of court on
behalf of the grand jury; and administrative subpoenas are issued by administrative
agencies with appropriate statutory authority.
29 18 USC § 2510(17) (2000).
30 See DOJ Search Manual at 94, 96-97 (cited in note 19).
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"temporarily" stored but remains on the provider's system in-
definitely. 31 The Justice Department contends that an e-mail
that continues to be stored on a provider's system is akin to a
remotely stored file, 32 entitled at most to the statute's lesser,
subpoena-like protections and falling outside of the statute alto-
gether when stored on a system that does not provide services to
the public. 33
We have each discussed elsewhere the difficulties with the
government's interpretation and the anomalies it produces. 34 For
now, the key point is that the Justice Department's narrow un-
derstanding of the statutory term "electronic storage"-an un-
derstanding that has achieved limited success in the few cases to
consider it 35-implies that government agents may acquire, by
compelled disclosure, a large category of stored e-mails. That
category includes those downloaded, accessed, or opened; sent or
drafted; or stored more than 180 days; without obtaining a war-
rant based on probable cause. Because the Justice Department
has never articulated a constitutional (as opposed to statutory)
distinction between e-mail not yet accessed by a subscriber and
e-mail already retrieved by a subscriber, its position necessarily
depends on the premise that the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement does not apply to stored e-mail at all-that the gov-
ernment must obtain a warrant before compelling a service pro-
vider to produce e-mail in electronic storage only because the
31 Id at 86-87.
32 Id at 87-89. Note that it is not clear if the shift takes place when the user accesses
the contents of the e-mail or when the user downloads the e-mail from a central server to
her own personal computer. See id at 88-89 (describing shift as taking place when user
"accesses" her ISP and "retrieves" her message).
33 How the statute protects an e-mail that remains on a provider's system depends,
in the Justice Department's view, on whether the provider offers services to the public,
such as Gmail. Non-public providers include universities and corporations that provide e-
mail services to their students and and/or employees. The crux of the Justice Depart-
ment's argument is that a provider that holds an e-mail after a recipient has accessed it
no longer acts as an "electronic communication service" with respect to that communica-
tion. Rather, with respect to that communication, it acts, if anything, as a "remote com-
puting service." DOJ Search Manual at 87-89. Since the SCA defines a remote computing
service as "the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services," 18 USC
§ 2711(2) (2000 & Supp IV 2004), communications already accessed by a subscriber qual-
ify for statutory protection only if they are stored with a provider that offers services to
the public.
34 See Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 49-52, 57-60 (cited in note 2); Bellia, 75 U Chi L
Rev at 174-75 (cited in note 20); Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1417-26 (cited in note 20).
35 Compare Fraser v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co, 135 F Supp 2d 623, 633-34 (E
D Pa 2001) (accepting the government's position), revd in part on other grounds, 352 F3d
107 (3d Cir 2003) with Theofel v Farey-Jones, 359 F3d 1066, 1076-77 (9th Cir 2004) (re-
jecting the government's position).
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SCA requires it and not because such compulsion constitutes a
search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
We provide our own critique of the government's position in
Parts II and III. What follows is our recounting of the history of
the Warshak case, because the district court and Sixth Circuit
panel stand as the only Article III courts to directly confront the
constitutional issue raised by the government's construction of
the SCA.
B. The Warshak Investigation
In the course of investigating Steven Warshak and his com-
pany, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, for suspected mail and
wire fraud and money laundering activities, the United States
sought access to Warshak's e-mail. In 2005, federal investigators
applied for court orders compelling two of Warshak's internet
service providers, NuVox Communications and Yahoo!, to dis-
close the contents of "wire or electronic communications (not in
electronic storage unless greater than 181 days old) that were
placed or stored in directories or files owned or controlled by"
Warshak. 36 NuVox and Yahoo! complied with the orders, appar-
ently producing thousands of electronic communications that
Warshak had sent or received over the previous nine years. 37
Instead of obtaining a warrant based on probable cause for
access to Warshak's e-mail accounts, the government sought and
obtained court orders pursuant to § 2703(d) of the SCA. As noted,
to obtain a § 2703(d) order, government investigators must mere-
ly provide the issuing court with "specific and articulable facts"
that demonstrate that the material they seek is "relevant" to an
ongoing criminal investigation. 38 The government did not notify
Warshak of the seizures of his e-mail until more than a year af-
ter issuance of the first court order. 39 Soon thereafter, Warshak
36 See Warshak v United States, 2006 WL 5230332, *1 (S D Ohio 2006). The order
further explained that e-mails "not in electronic storage" meant those e-mail communica-
tions "received by the specified accounts that the owner or user of the accounts has al-
ready accessed, viewed, or downloaded." Id. The Yahoo! order was similar. Id at *2.
37 Yahoo! did not disclose e-mails stored for fewer than 180 days; however, NuVox
"turned over to the government many emails which were less than 181 days old." See
Final Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Warshak, Warshak v United States, No 06-4092,
*2-3 (6th Cir filed Nov 13, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 4670943).
38 18 USC § 2703(d) (2000 & Supp 2005).
31 See Warshak, 2006 WL 5230332 at *2. The statute permits government agents to
delay notice to the target for 90 days, unless the agents obtain orders for extensions. 18
USC § 2705(a) (2000). The government never obtained any orders for extension. See War-
shak, 490 F3d at 460-61 & n 1. The SCA itself does not contain a penalty for the govern-
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filed suit against the government in the Southern District of
Ohio, claiming that the government's court orders violated both
the SCA and the Fourth Amendment. After Warshak's counsel
sought and was denied assurances from the government that it
would not again use a § 2703(d) order or similar procedure to
compel disclosure of further e-mails, Warshak moved for a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting such conduct.
C. The Warshak Litigation
1. The district court decision.
The district court did not directly consider Warshak's SCA
claim, but the court did hold that Warshak had demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of his constitutional claim.
With regard to senders' expectations of privacy, the court rea-
soned that stored e-mails are analogous to sealed letters or pack-
ages shipped by public or private carriers. 40 The Supreme Court
has held that "warrantless searches of such effects are presump-
tively unreasonable." 41 In resisting this analogy before the dis-
trict court in Warshak, the government had argued that ISPs
differ from public or private carriers of sealed letters or packages
because they typically reserve the right to access and delete e-
mails and to provide e-mails to law enforcement agents where
appropriate. Nonetheless, the district court concluded "as an ini-
tial matter" that it was not persuaded that "an individual sur-
renders his reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal e-
mails once he allows those e-mails (or electronic copies thereof)
to be stored on a subscriber account maintained on the server of
a commercial ISP."42
2.The government's arguments on appeal.
On appeal before the Sixth Circuit panel, the government
challenged the court's Fourth Amendment analysis using three
interrelated arguments. 43 The government's broadest argument
concerns the fact that agents proceed by compelling disclosure of
ment's noncompliance with the notice requirement.
40 Warshak, 2006 WL 5230332 at *4.
41 United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 114 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed pack-
ages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable.").
42 Warshak, 2006 WL 5230332 at *5.
43 The government also made various procedural arguments not discussed here.
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the e-mails they seek. According to the "compelled disclosure ar-
gument," the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does
not apply when the government chooses to compel disclosure or
production of an item rather than conduct a more traditional
search, such as of a home, or a more traditional seizure, such as
of a person. Instead, the argument posits, courts evaluate com-
pelled disclosure under a reasonableness inquiry, irrespective of
whether the target of the investigation retains an expectation of
privacy in the material the government seeks. According to the
government, so long as it seeks relevant information in a manner
that is not unduly burdensome, compelled disclosure of stored e-
mail without a warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment, with-
out any consideration of a user's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy or lack thereof.
Under the second argument 44-which we call the "third par-
ty argument" or "third party rule"-when a user relies on a third
party to hold his or her communications, that alone defeats any
expectation of privacy that otherwise might exist in those com-
munications. The government's logic seems to be that because a
subscriber necessarily "reveals" e-mail communications to her
ISP by allowing the ISP to store them, she assumes the risk that
the ISP might choose or even be compelled to disclose those re-
cords to the government.
As an alternative, under the third argument, which we call
the "ISP relationship" argument, the government claims that the
typical subscriber-ISP relationship defeats any expectation of
privacy that otherwise might exist in stored electronic communi-
cations. The government focuses in particular on (1) ISPs' techni-
cal ability to access the contents of communications; (2) ISP
terms of service, which typically reserve to the ISP the right to
access the contents of users' communications for various rea-
sons; 45 and (3) actual ISP practices of screening the contents of
communications for viruses, spam, and child pornography. Ac-
cording to the government, when a user accedes to an ISP rela-
tionship with these parameters, she forfeits any claim to an ex-
44 The government's pleadings and briefs reverse the order of the arguments above.
We treat the compelled disclosure argument first, however, because it is broader and thus
logically prior to the third party argument. That is, if the government is correct that
compelled disclosure is subject to a reasonableness inquiry in all circumstances-even if
the user retains an expectation of privacy in the materials sought to be compelled-then
the question whether the user does retain an expectation of privacy in the materials
becomes irrelevant.
45 See Part III C for further discussion of the ISP-user relationship.
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pectation of privacy in her stored communications, and thereby
forfeits any claim that government acquisition of her stored
communications is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
3.The panel's decision.
In concluding that users generally retain an expectation of
privacy in e-mails held by commercial service providers, the
Warshak panel explicitly or implicitly rejected each one of gov-
ernments' arguments. First, the court rejected a blanket "com-
pelled disclosure" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement and concluded that protection must instead turn on
whether the user retains a reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to the entity compelled to make the disclosure and
with respect to the information to be disclosed. Second, the panel
rejected the third party argument by implicitly concluding that
the mere fact that a service provider has possession of or control
over a user's communications does not, without more, eliminate
the user's expectation of privacy. Finally, regarding the ISP rela-
tionship argument, the court found that a provider's technical
ability to access the contents of the communication does not,
without more, eliminate the user's expectation of privacy. 46 Simi-
larly, the panel found that neither ISP terms of service nor ISP
screening practices are sufficient to extinguish an expectation of
privacy. 47
In rejecting each of government's arguments, the court nec-
essarily refined in important ways the expectation of privacy in-
quiry, at least as it applies to material held by a third party.
First, rather than being purely positive, the court's inquiry was
normative. That is, rather than focusing exclusively on actual
societal expectations with respect to the privacy of communica-
tions, the court considered the vital role e-mail plays in private
46 Warshak, 490 F3d at 471. In this respect, the court relied on the necessary impli-
cations of Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967), the decision in which the Supreme
Court first recognized that interception of telephone communications requires a warrant.
The Court could not have reached that result in Katz if the telephone provider's technical
ability to access the contents of a telephone communication had any Fourth Amendment
significance.
47 More specifically, the court observed that the use of software to screen messages
for spam, viruses, or child pornography does not expose the contents of communications
to any person at the ISP or elsewhere and that many instances in which ISPs reserve
rights to monitor communications involve "extraordinary" circumstances rather than the
ordinary course of business (as, for example, where a communication is claimed to violate
a third party's rights or jeopardize the provider's property). Warshak, 490 F3d at 474.
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communications: "protecting shared communications through
this medium is as important to Fourth Amendment principles
today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the
past."48 The court supplemented this inquiry with a positive in-
quiry designed to determine whether specific circumstances de-
feated this privacy interest. This positive analysis, however, es-
sentially reduced to a question of how a third party's access to a
communication affects the privacy interest that a normative
analysis would yield. The court first focused on the party with
whom the subscriber "shares" the communication, and precisely
what the subscriber discloses. A subscriber shares a communica-
tion with or discloses a communication to its recipient. The sub-
scriber does not disclose a communication to a provider in any
way relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis merely by vir-
tue of the fact that the provider has a technical ability to access
the communication, or by virtue of the fact that, in the ordinary
course of business, the provider must access limited additional
information necessary to route the communication properly.
In the end, the panel held that, except in limited circum-
stances, law enforcement agents must obtain a warrant based on
probable cause before they may compel a commercial service pro-
vider to disclose the e-mails it stores.49 The panel elaborated that
the government does not need to obtain a prior warrant when it
establishes to a reviewing court's satisfaction that the ISP has
extinguished its user's expectation of privacy in her communica-
tions by (a) explicitly reserving the right to monitor (b) the con-
tents of communications and (c) exercising that right in the ordi-
nary course of its business.50 Alternatively, the government may
avoid obtaining a prior warrant if it instead provides the target
with notice and an opportunity to be heard.51 As the district
court recognized, if the government were to choose the third op-
tion of forgoing either a warrant or a showing that the target
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stored e-mail,
the target would be able to raise a claim at the hearing that the
compelled disclosure invades his reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. 52 We revisit the issue of the target's claims in such hear-
18 Warshak, 490 F3d at 473.
49 Id at 475-76. The panel also specified that the government must comply with the
particularity requirement by not obtaining e-mails as to which the subscriber had not
waived a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id at 475-76 & n 8.
50 Id at 473-74.
51 Warshak at 475-76, 482.
52 See Warshak, 2006 WL5230332 at *8 ("Warshak should have the opportunity to
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ings and the panel's ambiguous comments on them in Part III D
2.
II. WHY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT
PROTECTS STORED E-MAIL: THE NATURE OF STORED E-MAIL
SURVEILLANCE
Recognizing that the government's acquisition of stored e-
mail constitutes a Fourth Amendment search would bring consti-
tutional regulation of modern surveillance practices into the
modern age and eliminate the strangely disparate treatment of
mailed and telephonic communications on the one hand and elec-
tronic communications on the other.53 When stored e-mails re-
ceive proper Fourth Amendment protection, government agents
will be able to access our stored electronic communications only
when their actions are subject to meaningful judicial oversight.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have long recognized
that the judiciary must play an active role in overseeing execu-
tive branch electronic surveillance. The Court emphasized that
need in Berger v New York,54 when it overturned a New York
statute that provided insufficient judicial involvement in execu-
tive branch surveillance practices. 55 As a matter of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, the Court opined that an electronic sur-
veillance scheme that operated without sufficient procedural
safeguards must be considered the sort of general warrant that
the Fourth Amendment specifically prohibits. 56
Twenty years later, seven federal courts of appeals inter-
preted Berger and the Fourth Amendment requirements it im-
present his case-in the ripe, concrete context of a specific email account targeted but not
yet seized by the United States-that [§] 2703(d) orders issued on less than a showing of
probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment.").
53 The ECPA currently provides significantly greater protection to wire communica-
tions, which are defined as including the human voice, than to electronic communica-
tions. See Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 41-42 (cited in note 2); Carr & Bellia, The Law of
Electronic Surveillance § 1:14 (cited in note 2).
54 388 US 41 (1967).
55 Id at 60 (concluding that the New York statute's "blanket grant of permission to
eavesdrop is without adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures"); id at 56
(noting that indiscriminate use of eavesdropping devices in law enforcement "raises
grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,' and imposes 'a
heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures,
quoting Osborn v United States, 385 US 323, 329 n 7 (1966)).
56 Berger, 388 US at 59 ("As with general warrants [the statute's failure to require
particularity] leaves too much to the discretion of the officer executing the order."); id at
64 ("Our concern with the statute here is whether its language permits a trespassory
invasion of the home or office, by general warrant, contrary to the command of the Fourth
Amendment.").
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posed to establish the need for heightened oversight of electronic
surveillance because of its unique features. 57 In particular, the
courts described electronic surveillance as intrusive, continuous,
hidden, and indiscriminate, and therefore in need of even more
judicial involvement than that accorded to searches of the home
or seizures of persons.58 Interestingly, in those cases, the courts
of appeals extended to the emerging practice of hidden video sur-
veillance by government agents the same heightened protections
that the Supreme Court had imposed in Berger.59 The 1968 pre-
cursor to the ECPA had not covered hidden video surveillance,
likely because it was not sufficiently commonplace to garner con-
gressional attention. The courts of appeals extended heightened
protection to video surveillance as a matter of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine, based on their assessment that it shares the same
key features as the wiretapping of traditional telephones.
Why then, have the courts not made the same finding with
regard to government access to stored electronic communica-
tions? As one of us has argued elsewhere, surely government ac-
cess to years of stored e-mail shares the characteristics of being
hidden, intrusive, continuous, and indiscriminate. 60 As we have
both argued, there are strong arguments for viewing access to
stored e-mail communications as much more informative than
traditional wiretapping and more efficient for information gath-
57 Consider United States v Mesa-Rincon, 911 F2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir 1990) (adopt-
ing the Berger requirements for determining the validity of video surveillance); United
States v Biasucci, 786 F2d 504, 510 (2d Cir 1986) (discussing the constitutional require-
ments Berger imposes on electronic surveillance). See also United States v Torres, 751 F
2d 875, 882-84 (7th Cir 1984) (concluding that video surveillance is "exceedingly intru-
sive" and must comport with the Fourth Amendment, and holding that the government's
compliance with the federal Wiretap Act satisfied Fourth Amendment requirements);
United States v Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir 1987) (following Torres
and Biasucci and concluding that the government's compliance with the federal Wiretap
Act's requirements "protect[s] the constitutional rights of those under surveillance as
they have been announced by the Supreme Court"); United States v Koyomejian, 970 F 2d
536, 542 (9th Cir 1992) (en banc) (concluding that, although the Wiretap Act does not
directly regulate video surveillance, the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to the
non-technical provisions of the Wiretap Act); United States v Falls, 34 F 3d 674, 680 (8th
Cir 1994) (following prior cases in holding that video surveillance is "a very serious ...
invasion of privacy" and distilling from the Wiretap Act procedures to implement the
Fourth Amendment); United States v Williams, 124 F 3d 411 (3d Cir 1997) (assuming the
validity of the approach of the other circuits).
58 See Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 79-80 (cited in note 2).
59 See cases cited in note 57.
60 Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 Stan Tech L
Rev 3 58-70, available at <http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf>'
(last visited Apr 11, 2008).
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ering than the more obvious analog of real-time access to e-mails
in transmission. 61
Shortly after its decision in Berger, the Supreme Court con-
sidered another Fourth Amendment challenge to government
surveillance practices. In Katz v United States,62 the Court held
that government agents' use of an electronic listening device to
pick up Katz's end of a telephone conversation constituted a
"search" and could not proceed without a warrant. 63 The Court
assessed whether government actions constituted a search by
asking whether the target justifiably expected privacy in his tel-
ephone conversations. 64 As developed in Justice Harlan's concur-
rence and in subsequent Supreme Court cases, the reasonable
expectation of privacy test asks whether the target of an investi-
gation entertains an actual expectation of privacy in the object of
the search (subjective prong) and whether that expectation of
privacy is one that society deems reasonable (objective prong). 65
Applying the Katz test to stored e-mail yields the conclusion
that it is reasonable to expect privacy in it. We set aside the sub-
jective inquiry for now because it will necessarily be case-
specific, although we think it clear that users, like Warshak,
generally have a subjective expectation of privacy in e-mails they
store with their ISPs.66 As the Court's reasoning in Katz demon-
strates, the objective inquiry requires normative rather than
merely positive analysis. 67 That is, in assessing whether a tar-
get's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable, a court must ask what society is entitled to
believe, even if society might perceive a communications medium
to be vulnerable or insecure in some way. Katz was decided at a
time when the public was well aware of the vulnerability of tele-
phone calls to interception. In the years preceding Katz, the pub-
lic had learned of rampant illegal wiretapping from numerous
influential books, scholarly articles, and newspaper accounts. 68
In the same period, as Congress considered new legislation, it
61 Warshak Law Professors' Brief at *7-8 (cited in note 6).
62 389 US 347 (1967).
63 Id at 348, 353.
64 Id at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a .'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.").
65 Id at 361 (Harlan concurring); Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 32-33 (2001).
66 See Warshak Law Professors' Brief at *4 (cited in note 6).
67 Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 28-31 (cited in note 60).
68 Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 38-39 (cited in note 2).
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convened numerous hearings and commissioned lengthy expert
reports that detailed communications' vulnerability. 69 The Katz
Court nevertheless concluded that an expectation of privacy in
one's telephone calls was reasonable. The Court based constitu-
tional protection on the overriding importance of the telephone
system, noting that "[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
in private communication."70 The Court reasoned that one who
places a telephone call "is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world."71
A normative analysis of stored e-mail reaches a similar re-
sult. First, like the telephone in Katz, e-mail plays a vital role in
modern communications. A court assessing how e-mail contrib-
utes to modern life would likely conclude that its role in enhanc-
ing communication is at least as important as the telephone. The
overriding importance of the medium should mean that we are
entitled to assume that it is private; any other conclusion would
be destructive of society's ability to communicate. Second, in
functional terms, much e-mail substitutes for or displaces other
forms of communication that society clearly views as private. We
send e-mails when in the past we might have made telephone
calls or had face-to-face conversations. We send e-mails when in
the past we might have sent letters. Because we expect privacy
in these more traditional forms of communication, we should be
entitled to expect privacy in e-mail as well; any other conclusion
would distort our incentives to use new communications tech-
nologies. Finally, e-mails often contain information of a highly
private nature, making e-mail surveillance at least as intrusive
as surveillance of other forms of communication. Although many
modern e-mails incorporate other media, even a simple text e-
mail can reveal a lengthy back-and-forth exchange between the
parties to the correspondence. People reveal in their e-mails
more about their political opinions, religious beliefs, personal
relationships, intellectual interests, and artistic endeavors than
they ever revealed over the telephone. Stored e-mails, in particu-
lar, contain a vast archive of people's past activities. We rely on
the privacy of the medium to communicate. A normative ap-
69 Id at 74-75.
70 Katz, 389 US at 352.
71 Id (emphasis added).
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proach to the expectation of privacy test ensures that we do not
rely at our peril.
There are likely several converging reasons why the courts
did not, prior to the Warshak panel, clearly affirm that stored e-
mails enjoy the same constitutional protection as telephone calls
and written letters. Some of it surely reflects the fact that the
targets of such investigations rarely found out that they had
been investigated because they were never told.72 Even when
they were given notice, the lack of a statutory suppression rem-
edy in the SCA as well as the lack of significant damages likely
provided little financial incentive to sue. 73 Many targets who
might have found it worthwhile to mount a constitutional chal-
lenge likely lacked the resources to do so. That would be particu-
larly true for defendants subject to other types of incriminating
evidence, for whom having the stored e-mails excluded from trial
would not likely lead to acquittal and for whom it would there-
fore not be worth incurring substantial cost to obtain such exclu-
sion.
Part of the problem surely stems from courts' practices of re-
lying on the executive branch to parse the SCA due its incredible
complexity. 74 Only recently have magistrate and trial judges be-
gun to push the DOJ to better support its proffered interpreta-
72 In the Warshak investigation, for example, the government delayed the statutorily
required notice for over a year, apparently without seeking the required judicial approval
for an extension of the 90-day delay. See note 39 and accompanying text. See also Frei-
wald, 56 Ala L Rev at 65 (cited in note 2) (noting limited notice requirements in the SCA);
Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment,
41 Harv CR-CL L Rev 67, 104 (discussing how "secrecy in many guises, combined with
executive branch control of information as well as the venue and timing of litigation
about its own actions, have created impediments to any meaningful form of judicial re-
view" with respect to several provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act).
73 See note 208 (listing limited civil remedies). See also Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 63-
64 (cited in note 2) (discussing absence of suppression remedy and limited financial in-
centives to sue). See also Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the 'Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Law, 54 Hastings L J 805 (2003) (arguing
that a statutory suppression remedy would clarify the SCA by giving courts an opportu-
nity to delineate permissible practices).
74 Courts frequently decry the complexity of electronic surveillance statutes. See, for
example, Konop v Hawaiian Airlines, Inc, 302 F3d 868, 874 (9th Cir 2002) ("Courts have
struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology within the confines of this
statutory framework, often with unsatisfying results"); Steve Jackson Games, Inc v US
Secret Service, 36 F3d 457, 462 (5th Cir 1994) (calling the Wiretap Act "famous (if not
infamous) for its lack of clarity"); United States v Smith, 155 F3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir
1998) (suggesting that the Steve Jackson Games court "might have put the matter too
mildly"). See also Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20
Berkeley Tech L J 1283, 1318-23 (2005) (discussing courts' perceptions of complexity);
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1292-93 (2004) (noting "profound complexity").
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tions of the SCA and related statutes and, in several cases,
courts have found those interpretations lacking. 75 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, there seemed to be a rough consensus
among academics and others that the third party rule would
doom any arguments about the constitutional protection of
stored e-mail. 76 Surprisingly, given the length of time that we
have been using e-mail extensively, it took until 2007 for a fed-
eral appellate court to evaluate the constitutional question itself.
Whatever explains the lack of cases contesting the constitu-
tionality of the government's compelled disclosure of stored e-
mails before Warshak, it is essential to recognize that no court
has ever found the government's practice to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. There is thus no argument that the absence of case
law considering the constitutionality of the government's prac-
tices forecloses claims that those practices violate the Fourth
Amendment. 77 Moreover, we agree with the Warshak panel's
conclusion that, like telephone calls and written letters, stored e-
mails are subject to meaningful Fourth Amendment protection.
Except in exceptional circumstances, stored e-mails may not be
searched, or compelled to be disclosed, without a warrant based
on probable cause or a valid exception to the warrant require-
ment. 78
75 Consider Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic
Surveillance, 41 USF L Rev 589 (2007) (describing and analyzing recent cases). See also
In re United States, 534 F Supp 2d 585 (W D Penn 2008) (rejecting the government's use
of an order under 18 USC § 2703(d) to obtain records of cell site locations passed by sub-
scriber).
76 See, for example, DOJ Search Manual at 94 (cited in note 19); Orin S. Kerr, The
Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Georgetown L J 357, 366-67 (2003) (assuming
that when one sends an e-mail, one "disclos[es] the communication" to the ISP and de-
scribing "black letter rule that the Fourth Amendment permits the government to obtain
information disclosed to a third party using a mere subpoena"); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S Cal L Rev 1083, 1135
(2002) ("Individuals ... probably do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in com-
munications and records maintained by ISPs or computer network system administra-
tors."). We disagree strongly with that reading of the third party rule, and we explain our
disagreement at length in Part III B.
77 The government nevertheless made this argument throughout the litigation in
Warshak. for example, Brief for Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Warshak
v United States, No 06-4092, *3 (6th Cir filed Oct 13, 2006), available at <http://w2.
eff.org/legal]cases/warshak-v-usalwarshak-finalproofLbrief.pdf> (last visited Apr 11,
2008) ("Government Proof Brief') ("Until this case, no court had ever declared § 2703 to
be unconstitutional."); id at *14 ("For twenty years, the Stored Communications Act has
set forth the procedures that the government must follow to compel disclosure of e-mail,
and no court has previously held it to be unconstitutional.").
78 In Part IV B, we discuss arguments for why the Fourth Amendment might impose
an even higher procedural hurdle.
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III. REFUTING THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENTS
In this Part, we address directly the arguments that the
government made before the Sixth Circuit panel in Warshak. As
noted earlier, the central issue for the Warshak panel was how to
apply the Fourth Amendment to government agents' compelled
disclosure of communications from a third party service provider.
We argue that the precedents not only support the Warshak pan-
el's ultimate conclusion, they provide firmer ground than the
panel itself recognized. In addition, the panel could have gone
even further in rejecting the government's arguments and in cla-
rifying the circumstances under which an e-mail user retains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in stored e-mails.
A. The Compelled Disclosure Argument
Throughout the Warshak litigation, the government argued
that agents need only satisfy a "reasonableness" standard when
they compel an ISP to divulge its users' e-mails. 79 To be sure, the
government based much of its argument that it may proceed in
such cases without a warrant on its claim that targets have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail stored with their
ISPs. That, in turn, follows from the government's reading of the
"third party rule" that we critique in the next section. But the
government also argued that, notwithstanding the target's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement agents may sat-
isfy the lesser requirement of reasonableness when they compel
disclosure of stored e-mails because that is the standard of re-
view for subpoenas and related court orders under § 2703(d).80
As we pointed out in an amicus brief filed in the Sixth Cir-
cuit on behalf of professors of electronic privacy law and internet
law, it would turn constitutional doctrine on its head if executive
branch agents could select a procedure to follow, in this case a
subpoena or § 2703(d) court order, and then justify that choice on
the grounds that they met the reduced standard associated with
that choice.81 Were the government correct, it could simply write
the warrant requirement out of the Fourth Amendment by "com-
pelling" production of evidence rather than searching for it.
79 See, for example, Government Proof Brief at *38-45 (cited in note 77).
80 Id at *45 ("Mhe constitutionality of a third-party subpoena turns on its reason-
ableness, not on whether the target has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sub-
poenaed items.").
81 Warshak Law Professors' Brief at *20-21 (cited in note 6).
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Fourth Amendment doctrine itself establishes procedural hur-
dles for executive branch agents that require judicial branch in-
tervention commensurate with the intrusiveness of investigation
and its need for supervision.8 2 When the government invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the propriety of that action must be judged by a neu-
tral magistrate, and not by agents in the field.8 3
While we view it as obvious that executive branch agents
may not select for themselves the level of judicial review to
which their practices will be subject,8 4 as the government's claim
would imply, we nonetheless address the government's argument
here in greater depth. Ambiguous language in the Warshak
panel decision, which suggested that, after notice, a target would
be able to raise only reasonableness objections to the govern-
ment's use of a subpoena or § 2703(d) court order to compel his
ISP to disclose his e-mails, further supports the need to clarify
what review attends compelled disclosure by subpoena or related
court order. 85
Case law has established that recipients of subpoenas may
challenge the compulsion to appear or produce documents on
limited bases, namely that compliance with their issuance is ei-
ther overbroad or unduly burdensome.86 But that standard gov-
82 See Berger, 388 US at 56 (noting that indiscriminate use of eavesdropping devices
in law enforcement '"raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,' and imposes 'a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the
fairness of procedures,"' quoting Osborn v United States, 385 US 329 n 7 (1966)).
83 Katz, 389 US at 356 (1967) (rejecting the argument that the Court should validate
officers' conduct because they did no more than they might properly have done with prior
judicial sanction; "It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a
judicial officer.").
84 Consider Doe v Gonzales, 500 F Supp 2d 379, 412 (S D NY 2007) (observing that
Congress cannot dictate the degree of deference the judiciary must accord the executive
in reviewing a challenged speech restriction).
85 More specifically, the panel stated that government agents need not obtain a war-
rant "if the government provides notice to the account holder in seeking an SCA order,
according him the same judicial review he would be allowed were he to be subpoenaed."
Warshak, 490 F3d at 476 (emphasis added). Other language in the opinion suggests that
the target can raise broader objections, including that he or she has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the communications. See id at 469 (noting that government's argument
"begs the critical question of whether an e-mail user maintains a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his e-mails vis-a-vis the party who is subject to compelled disclosure-in this
instance, the ISPs" and opining that, if the user does retain an expectation of privacy,
"the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard controls the e-mail seizure"). We
discuss this issue at greater length in Part III D 2. See also note 52 (providing district
court's language).
86 See, for example, Donovan v Lone Steer, Inc, 464 US 408, 415 (1984) (noting re-
quirements that subpoena "be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and
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erns the initial need to appear, and it does not necessarily apply
to the investigation of all materials or information the compelled
party may have. In cases in which subpoenas have been issued to
obtain materials that the targets claimed were subject to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, courts, including the Supreme
Court, have recognized that reviewing courts must determine
whether the precise information sought is indeed subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
In other words, courts that address challenges to a subpoena
must employ a two-step process. In the first step, courts consider
whether compelling the target to come forward by subpoena
meets the reasonableness requirement. If so, they proceed to
consider the target's claim that the precise information sought is
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. In discussing the
first step, courts have distinguished between compelled disclo-
sure on the one hand and searches or seizures on the other. Be-
cause a compelled disclosure is significantly less intrusive than a
search or seizure, and because it is subject to judicial oversight
when challenged, the Supreme Court has stated that it may be
challenged for lack of reasonableness only. For example, in its
1973 decision in United States v Dionisio,8 7 the Supreme Court
quoted from the Second Circuit case of United States v Doe
(Schwartz),88 when it explained:
"The latter [the seizure of a person] is abrupt, is effected
with force or the threat of it and often in demeaning cir-
cumstances, and, in the case of arrest, results in a record
involving social stigma. A subpoena is served in the same
manner as other legal process; it involves no stigma
whatever; if the time for appearance is inconvenient, this
can generally be altered; and it remains at all times un-
der the control and supervision of a court."8 9
While the Dionisio and Schwartz courts rejected the notion,
based on the distinction just given, that government agents have
to establish probable cause before using a subpoena to compel
the target in each case to appear before the grand jury, they cer-
specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome"'), quoting
See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541, 544 (1967). Of course targets may raise Fifth Amend-
ment objections to being compelled to testify, but in this section we focus on Fourth
Amendment claims.
87 410 US 1 (1973).
88 457 F2d 895 (2d Cir 1972).
89 Dionisio, 410 US at 10, quoting Schwartz, 457 F2d at 898.
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tainly did not establish that use of a subpoena obviated the need
to consider the target's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
actual materials sought. In both cases, the targets claimed that
the Fourth Amendment prohibited use of a subpoena to compel
them to furnish handwriting and voice exemplars to a grand
jury, and in both cases the courts considered, in a second step,
whether in fact the targets had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in those exemplars.
In Schwartz, the Second Circuit court ultimately held that
the target had no expectation of privacy in her handwriting or
voice: "[W]hile the content of a communication is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection, the underlying identifying char-
acteristics-the constant factor throughout both public and pri-
vate communications-are open for all to see or hear."90 In Dion-
isio, the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as the Sec-
ond Circuit and held that the requirement to make voice re-
cordings did not infringe any expectation of privacy since the
Fourth Amendment provides no protection for physical charac-
teristics, such as the sound of one's voice, that an individual
knowingly and necessarily exposes to the public.9' As the Su-
preme Court said: "[n]o person can have a reasonable expectation
of privacy that others will not know the sound of his voice, any
more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mys-
tery to the world."92
Again, in both cases, the Fourth Amendment review of sub-
poenas involved two distinct questions: (1) did the order that the
individuals appear before the grand jury violate the Fourth
Amendment; and (2) once the individuals were lawfully before
the grand jury, did the further direction to make voice recordings
violate the Fourth Amendment.9 3 While the answer to the first
question was clearly no,94 the answer to the second turned on an
90 Schwartz, 457 F2d at 898 (citation omitted).
91 Dionisio, 410 US at 14-15.
92 Id at 14 (analyzing the giving of voice exemplars according to the decision in Katz,
389 US at 351).
93 Id at 8 ("As the Court made clear in Schmerber [v California], the obtaining of
physical evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two
different levels-the 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to bring him into contact with
government agents and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence.') (citation
omitted); Dionisio, 410 US at 13-14 ("But the conclusion that Dionisio's compulsory ap-
pearance before the grand jury was not an unreasonable 'seizure' is the answer to only
the first part of the Fourth Amendment inquiry here. Dionisio argues that the grand
jury's subsequent directive to make the voice recording was itself an infringement of his
rights under the Fourth Amendment.').
94 Id at 10.
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analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy and was en-
tirely independent of the first.95 As the Second Circuit made
plain:
[T]he fact that compulsory appearance before a grand jury
is not a seizure of the person does not lead automatically
to the conclusion that nothing the grand jury may require
could constitute a search. The test must be whether the
requirement invades a 'reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.'96
The government's compelled disclosure argument in the
Warshak case essentially asked the Sixth Circuit to collapse
these two questions into one. 97 Although it is possible to identify
numerous cases in which courts have assessed the compelled
production of documents under a reasonableness standard, the
cases involve corporate or business records that are not subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 98 The cases therefore do
not undermine the Dionisio Court's approach of independently
assessing the two Fourth Amendment interests in question.
Even the case of United States v Miller,99 upon which the gov-
ernment's Warshak argument lays heavy emphasis, is consistent
with the approach the Court laid out in Dionisio. In Miller, the
95 Dionisio, 410 US at 13-15.
96 Schwartz, 457 F2d at 898 (emphasis added).
97 Although some appellate courts have used language that seems to blur the distinc-
tion the Court made in Dionisio, those cases actually rejected the notion that a subpoena
to produce documents, not subject to reasonable expectation of privacy, required a prob-
able cause warrant. See, for example, In re Bailey (Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F3d 341,
348 (4th Cir 2000) (noting that if the "assertion that investigative subpoenas may be
issued only upon probable cause" were correct, the result would be a paradox where "the
object of many such investigations--to determine whether probable cause exists to prose-
cute such a violation-would become a condition precedent for undertaking the investiga-
tion."). See also Doe v United States, 253 F3d 256, 264 (6th Cir 2001) (quoting Bailey, 228
F3d at 348).
98 See Donovan, 464 US at 415 (sustaining enforcement of a subpoena of restaurant-
motel's payroll and sales records and emphasizing that "[i]t is now settled that, when an
administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment
requires"' only reasonableness), quoting See v City of Seattle, 387 US at 544 (emphasis
added); SEC v Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc, 467 US 735, 743 (1984) (rejecting a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to officials' failure to provide notice of a third-party subpoena to the tar-
get of an investigation, when the subpoena sought financial records in the hands of firms
with whom target had engaged in transactions); Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 401
n 7 (1976) (noting the absence of arguments of a Fourth Amendment nature in a case
involving the subpoena of accountants' records from taxpayers' attorneys, and observing
that "[s]pecial problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal
diary are not involved here").
99 425 US 435 (1976).
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Supreme Court assessed whether a subpoena compelling a bank
to disclose its customer's financial records violated the Fourth
Amendment.100 Miller, the target of the investigation, claimed a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.l'0 Although it
rejected Miller's argument, the Supreme Court never suggested
that mere use of a subpoena defeated the need to inquire into
Miller's expectation of privacy or converted the applicable stan-
dard to one of reasonableness. The Court concluded that a rea-
sonableness standard applied to the compelled disclosure of
Miller's records not because use of a subpoena, without more,
overcomes a target's expectation of privacy, but because the sorts
of records at issue in Miller--"business records," in the Court's
terminology' 02-involved no expectation of privacy. 10 3 If the
Fourth Amendment required only reasonableness in compelled
disclosure cases, the Miller Court could have sustained the gov-
ernment's conduct without ever inquiring into whether Miller
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Despite the fallacy of the government's compelled disclosure
argument, the Warshak panel, relying on broad dictum from a
prior Sixth Circuit case, 0 4 began its analysis by stating that, in
100 The subpoenas required the banks to produce, for specified time periods, "all re-
cords of accounts" in Miller's name. The banks showed agents microfilm records of
Miller's accounts and gave agents copies of checks, deposit slips, financial statements,
and monthly statements. Id at 437-38.
101 Id at 442.
102 The Court's focus on business records is evident from its quotation of language
from Oklahoma Press Publishing Co v Walling, 327 US 186 (1946). The Miller Court
quoted that case's observation that '"the Fourth [Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas
for the production of business records and papers], at the most guards against abuse only
by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make
and the materials specified are relevant." Miller, 425 US at 445-46, quoting Oklahoma
Press Publishing, 327 US at 208. The bracketed language is that of the Miller Court, and
its narrow characterization of Oklahoma Press Publishing is accurate. The Oklahoma
Press Publishing Court distilled case law that dealt "merely" with "production of corpo-
rate records and papers in response to a subpoena." Oklahoma Press Publishing, 327 US
at 208 (emphasis added).
103 The Miller Court did not in fact apply the reasonableness standard because the
banks upon which the subpoenas were served did not contest their validity. Miller, 425
US at 446 n 9. The Court nevertheless implied that the reasonableness standard was the
appropriate one. Id at 446.
104 Doe v United States, 253 F3d at 263-64. In Doe, a doctor who was under investiga-
tion for health care fraud moved to quash an administrative subpoena issued under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). The court applied a
reasonableness standard to the question of disclosure of Doe's records. The court's obser-
vation that "whereas the Fourth Amendment mandates a showing of probable cause for
issuance of search warrants, subpoenas are analyzed only under the Fourth Amend-
ment's general reasonableness standard" was dictum because the target raised no claim
on appeal that a probable cause standard should apply. Id.
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general, subpoenas are tested only under the Fourth Amend-
ment's general reasonableness standard. The panel then invoked
a "Fourth Amendment caveat" to this rule when it stated that a
target who can demonstrate that he has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the records sought by subpoena can dispute that
subpoena's issuance on Fourth Amendment grounds. 10 5 Whether
stated as a caveat or as a second step, the reasonable expectation
of privacy analysis is crucial to evaluating the Fourth Amend-
ment regulation of compelled access to stored e-mails. Because
that analysis in turn requires consideration of the third party
argument, we discuss that argument next. As we will argue, and
as the Warshak panel properly recognized, the government's
broad reading of the third party rule seeks to extend precedents
well beyond their holdings.
B. The Third Party Argument
In addition to its argument that all compelled disclosures
merit only reasonableness review, the government has also ar-
gued that users lack any expectation of privacy in those stored e-
mails that reside on their ISPs' servers. Under the government's
logic, a subscriber reveals e-mail communications to her ISP
merely by allowing the ISP to store them and she thereby as-
sumes the risk that the ISP might choose or even be compelled to
disclose those records to the government.
The government's argument relies on an overbroad reading
of the Supreme Court's decision in the Miller case just discussed.
The government derives from Miller's language a third party
rule that posits that a user forfeits any expectation of privacy in
information that may be obtained from a third party. 106 The fol-
lowing quote contains the pertinent language from Miller:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. This Court has held repeat-
edly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
105 Warshak, 490 F3d at 468-69.
106 See Government Proof Brief at *38 (cited in note 77) (arguing that "the govern-
ment may compel a third party to disclose anything that the third party can access").
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used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed. 10 7
Although courts could view this language as inviting the
government's broad third party rule, they should decline the in-
vitation for several reasons. First, Miller falls into a line of cases
concerning "business records" and "corporate records" before
them. Stored e-mails look nothing like business or corporate re-
cords, but rather entail private communications.1 0 8 Although
Miller may push the scope of the "business records" category to
its limits, nothing in Miller suggests that the category is all-
encompassing-that one lacks an expectation of privacy in any-
thing in the hands of a third party. Moreover, by their nature,
storage lockers and letters and packages in the hands of third
parties are much more analogous to e-mails stored with ISPs
than are the business records at issue in Miller.
Second, reading Miller's "assumption of risk" approach
broadly creates undue tension with Katz. Even the narrower
reading of it meshes poorly with the actual facts of Miller and
fits the stored e-mail context even worse. In Miller, the Court
viewed bank customers as having made the voluntary choice to
reveal their documents to the banks when they could not easily
function in modern society without a bank account. 109 It is odd to
view a bank customer's use of a bank as analogous to misplacing
trust in a confidant, as the Court did in using the assumption of
risk approach in Miller. 110 Because the assumption of risk analy-
sis in Miller was such a stretch, there is no reason to extend it
further to apply in the context of stored e-mails. That is espe-
cially so because those in analogous relationships that better
match users' relationships with their ISPs do not assume the
risk of warrantless compelled disclosure.
In Part III C, we will address whether the ISP's relationship
with its customer amounts to a constitutional privacy waiver.
107 Miller, 425 US at 443 (emphasis added).
108 See Part II.
109 See Miller, 425 US at 451 (1976) (Brennan dissenting) (stating that "the disclosure
by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely voli-
tional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account"), quoting Burrows v Superior Court, 529 P2d 590,
596 (Cal 1975); Wayne LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure § 3.26) (Thomson 4th ed 2004).
See also Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall dissenting) ("[Unless a
person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional
necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.').
110 See Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1402 (cited in note 20).
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But as an initial matter, courts should reject the idea that those
whose e-mails may be accessed by their ISPs have assumed the
risk that the government will access those e-mails without a
warrant. Even if a bank customer were to assume the risk her
bank will voluntarily disclose her documents, which, again, are
not her communications, that does not mean that she assumes
the different risk that the government will compel the bank to
disclose those documents without first obtaining a warrant.
As for the third party argument, it should be clear that
courts must chart new ground to determine the constitutional
status of stored e-mail. Subpoena law, which has addressed
business records in the hands of third parties, has not yet ad-
dressed a fundamentally new phenomenon: storage by third par-
ties of another's private communications. Though it might seem
an easy way to resolve the question,'11 to use a broad third party
rule from Miller is to read much more into the case than it de-
serves and to misapprehend the nature of stored e-mail.
1. Stored e-mails are neither "corporate" nor
"business" records.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have historically
treated business and corporate records as less deserving of pri-
vacy than confidential communications, and the latter is what
one finds in stored e-mail. 112 For example, the Miller Court be-
gan its Fourth Amendment analysis by observing that "[w]e
must examine the nature of the particular documents sought to
be protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate
'expectation of privacy' concerning their contents."'113 The Court
then clearly indicated that the documents at issue did not consti-
tute confidential communications, for which, impliedly, a differ-
ent analysis would be appropriate. As the Court discussed:
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and
deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies actually
viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, we per-
ceive no legitimate 'expectation of privacy' in their con-
tents. The checks are not confidential communications but
111 Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at I 41-44 (cited in note 60) (discussing courts'
"short cuts" in analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy).
112 Whether some stored e-mail may more properly be considered as a record of a
transaction and therefore not a private communication is an important issue that is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
113 425 US at 442 (emphasis added).
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negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transac-
tions. 114
The Court's distinction between "confidential communica-
tions" on the one hand and "negotiable instruments" used in
"commercial transactions" on the other reflects precedent cases
in which the Court withheld robust Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from the compelled disclosure of corporate records.
Starting in the 1906 case of Hale v Henkel, 115 the Court held
that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment
barred the government's access to corporate records. 116 The
Court distinguished between the rights of the corporation, as "a
creature of the state," and the rights of a citizen, who "owes no
duty to the State ... to divulge his business" and who has "im-
munity... from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the
law." 117 Similarly, in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co v Walling,
when the government targeted a corporation and sought its re-
cords, the Court analogized the federal government's investiga-
tive powers over corporations to the "visitorial" power of the in-
corporating state. 118
The Court in Oklahoma Press distilled prior case law as fol-
lows: "[fIn so far as [earlier cases] apply merely to the production
of corporate records and papers in response to a subpoena or or-
der authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction,"
those cases establish that "the Fourth [Amendment], if applica-
ble, at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth ... if also the inquiry is one the de-
manding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
specified are relevant." 119 In subsequent cases involving subpoe-
nas to compel production of a corporation's records, the Court
continued to distinguish between corporate records and private
114 Id.
115 201 US 43 (1906), overruled in part, Murphy v Waterfront Commissioner of NY
Harbor, 378 US 52 (1964).
116 The Court thus repudiated the prior case of Boyd v United States, 116 US 616
(1886), in which the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment (and the Fifth) barred
the government from compelling the owners of goods to produce relevant invoices. Id at
638.
117 Hale, 201 US at 74.
118 327 US at 204.
119 Id at 208 (emphasis added). The Court explained that Congress can authorize
access to corporate records by administrative subpoena in part because, when a corpora-
tion's activities affect interstate commerce, Congress possesses a wide investigative
power over it, "analogous to the visitorial power of the incorporating state." Id at 204 &
nn 31-32.
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documents, suggesting that the latter were immune from com-
pulsory process. 120
After Katz, courts continued to deny Fourth Amendment
claims regarding records kept by businesses, but they did so by
finding no expectation of privacy in those records. For example,
in Couch v United States,121 the Supreme Court rejected a tax-
payer's Fourth Amendment objection to enforcement of a sum-
mons requiring her accountant to produce records that Couch
had provided for use in her tax returns. 122 When the accountant
refused to produce the records and the IRS sought judicial en-
forcement of the summons, Couch intervened to assert that her
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination barred the
government from compelling the accountant to produce the re-
cords. 123 The Court addressed the Fourth Amendment claim only
briefly, due to the dominance of Fifth Amendment issues, but
concluded nonetheless that "the necessary expectation of pri-
vacy" under Katz "to launch a valid Fourth Amendment claim
does not exist."'124 The Court reasoned that "there can be little
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an account-
ant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the informa-
tion therein is required in an income tax return."'125
Couch became the foundation for a series of cases involving
records turned over to third parties for the third parties to per-
form particular tasks with such records-with all of the cases
rejecting claims that an individual can retain an expectation of
privacy in the records. Miller and Couch thus expanded the cate-
gory of records subject to warrantless compelled disclosure be-
yond records about the corporation. The documents sought in
Miller and Couch concerned the bank depositor and the taxpayer
whose records were stored with the targets of the subpoenas,
while in the prior cases the corporation was the target of the in-
vestigation and received the subpoena. However, even in Miller,
the Court's focus on the character of the records at issue was
120 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DePaul L Rev 805, 816-17
(2005); Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1397-99 (cited in note 20); Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1557, 1576-82 (2004).
121 409 US 322 (1973).
122 Id at 323-24, 325 n 6. The Court also rejected a Fifth Amendment claim. Id at 325,
331. We return to a discussion to the relevance of Fifth Amendment doctrine in these
cases in Part III B 3.
123 Id at 325, 331.
124 Couch, 409 US at 336 n 19.
125 Id at 335.
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unmistakable: they were "not confidential communications"126 ;
they were records "exposed ... in the ordinary course of busi-
ness" or "business records of the banks."'127
To justify using the Miller case to resolve the stored-records
question, then, a court must regard stored e-mails as close
enough to the bank's business records at issue in Miller as to
warrant the same treatment. We have already made the most
crucial argument opposed to that conclusion: stored e-mails are
more properly considered confidential communications than the
records of a business. In light of that, limiting the judicial over-
sight attendant to the disclosure of stored e-mails raises con-
cerns not only under the Fourth Amendment but also the First
Amendment.' 28 We return to the special nature of stored e-mails
as records of communications rather than the non-
communications records of a business in Part III C.
Meanwhile, another reason not to analogize stored e-mails to
business records is that there are much better analogies. In par-
ticular, analogies to a third party's carriage or storage of physical
property better capture the role a third party ISP plays when it
stores e-mail.
Cases involving a third party's carriage or storage of physi-
cal property clearly provide that the government must obtain a
warrant before investigating the items it seeks. 29 As the Su-
preme Court has recognized, "[1]etters and other sealed packages
are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has
a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such
effects are presumptively unreasonable."'' 3 0 The same general
rule applies to luggage carried by private transportation compa-
126 Miller, 425 US at 442 (emphasis added).
127 Id at 440, 442.
128 See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 NYU L Rev
112 (2007); Mulligan, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1587 (cited in note 120). See also In re Unit-
ed States, 534 F Supp 2d 585, 612 (W D Penn 2008) (discussing the "associational inter-
ests implicated" by government access to stored electronic records disclosing cell-phone
users' movements); id at 591 n 21 (noting the link between Fourth Amendment protection
and First Amendment associational interests and citing Katz). We will address further
where to draw the line between an ISP's business records and stored e-mails in Part III
C.
129 One exception is the case of United States v Palmer, 536 F2d 1278 (9th Cir 1976),
which the government cited in its Warshak brief. See Government Proof Brief at *45
(cited in note 77). For an argument distinguishing Palmer, see Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev
at 1410-11 (cited in note 20).
130 Jacobsen, 466 US at 114. See also Exparte Jackson, 96 US 727, 733 (1877) ('Let-
ters and sealed packages ... are as fully guarded from examination and inspection.., as
if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.").
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nies.' 3 ' Similarly, when someone maintains personal property on
a third party's premises, she retains an expectation of privacy in
the property, even though the third party may have the right to
access the premises for some purposes. 132 While third parties in
such cases may retain extensive rights of access to the property
under both contract and common law in order to provide their
service or protect their property, the property carried, trans-
ported, or stored has never been treated as were the business
records in Miller. Moreover, and as we next address, the notion
that the property owner "assumes the risk" that government
agents will compel the third party to turn the property over is
entirely absent from case law dealing with personal property.
2.Assumption of risk.
As the broad language from the Miller case illustrates, the
Supreme Court combined both the corporate records cases and
the assumption of risk cases to decide Miller. One of us has ar-
gued elsewhere that the Supreme Court could have decided the
Miller case without getting into the "assumption of risk" analy-
sis. 133 But it did rely on the customer's assumption of risk, and
the government has made that an integral part of its broad third
party rule, under which e-mail users assume the risk that their
ISPs will disclose their stored e-mails merely by virtue of the
government's ability to obtain the stored e-mails from the ISPs.
a) Conflicts with Katz. The strongest version of the assump-
tion of risk argument is that a third party's technical ability to
gain access to communications, without more, eliminates a user's
131 See Bond v United Statpe, 529 US 334, 338-39 (2000) (holding that petitioner bus
passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his carry-on bag and that agent's
warrantless physical manipulation of the bag violated petitioner's reasonable expectation
of privacy).
132 See, for example, Stoner v California, 376 US 483, 489 (1964) (search of hotel room
without warrant violated Fourth Amendment, even though one who engages a hotel room
gives implied permission to hotel personnel to enter to perform their duties); Chapman v
United States, 365 US 610, 616-18 (1961) (search of house occupied by tenant violated
Fourth Amendment, even though landlord had authority to enter house for some pur-
poses); United States v Johns, 851 F2d 1131, 1133-35 (9th Cir 1988) (implicitly recogniz-
ing reasonable expectation of privacy in rented storage unit). But see cases discussed in
note 184 (describing how benefits of third party relationship persist only while the rela-
tionship itself persists and has not been substantially violated by the first party).
133 Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1397-1402 (cited in note 20). See also Miller, 425 US
at 442 (finding that "the lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to be maintained because they
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory investigations and pro-
ceedings") (citation omitted).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in them. Katz itself forecloses
that argument. Katz involved communications carried over a
telephone line by a communications carrier that had the techni-
cal ability to monitor the communications, and yet the Court con-
cluded that agents' use of a listening device to overhear the tar-
get's end of a conversation invaded the target's privacy. 134
The only way to reconcile Miller with Katz-which Miller
purported to apply rather than to overrule-is to recognize that
communications are not "revealed" to a third party merely be-
cause that third party has the technical ability to gain access to
them. 135
b) Assumption of what risk? In Miller, the Supreme Court
never claimed that mere accessibility of Miller's records to the
bank precluded Miller's reasonable expectation of privacy claim.
Instead, the Court reasoned that Miller's disclosure of his bank
records to the bank precluded him from raising that claim. As
the Court noted:
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed. 136
What may not be entirely clear from the above quote is that
Miller's reliance on the assumption of risk cases implied three
findings about Miller that the facts of the case do not support.
Those are: 1) that Miller had voluntarily revealed his banking
information to the bank, 2) that the bank was therefore a party
to his communications, and 3) that when one assumes the risk
that a party to one's communication will voluntarily reveal the
communication to the government, one also assumes the risk
that the government will compel that party to disclose the com-
munication. As we next discuss, those findings are difficult to
support in the context of bank records and make even less sense
when applied to the context of stored e-mails.
In the precedent cases from which the Miller Court drew,
the Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment does
134 Katz, 389 US at 353.
135 See Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 (cited in note 60) (rejecting argument that
"fact-of-interceptibility" determines constitutional privacy).
136 Miller, 425 US at 443.
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not preclude a government informant from testifying about a
conversation to which he was a party. In Hoffa v United
States,137 the Court denied a defendant's motion to suppress the
testimony of a witness who had been present for several conver-
sations in which the defendant had made incriminating state-
ments. 138 The Court held that "no interest legitimately protected
by the Fourth Amendment is involved" because the Fourth
Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it."'139
After Katz, the Supreme Court made clear that its assump-
tion of risk analysis had survived that decision. In United States
v White,140 for example, the Court approved the warrantless use
of an electronic listening device by a government informant. 141 A
plurality of the White Court distinguished Katz as follows:
Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a party
to conversations with the defendant nor did the Court in-
dicate in any way that a defendant has a justifiable and
constitutionally protected expectation that a person with
whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the
conversation to the police. 142
The Miller Court tacked assumption-of-risk analysis onto its
application of subpoena doctrine. 143 In doing so, the Court im-
plied that the bank with whom Miller transacted could be analo-
gized to the parties to communications in the precedent cases. In
developing that point, the Supreme Court focused on the fact
that Miller had voluntarily transacted with the bank, and that
137 385 US 293 (1966).
138 Id at 294-95.
139 Id at 302. See also Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 437-38 (1963) (holding that
evidence derived from conversation surreptitiously recorded by a government agent was
admissible, even though government had not sought prior judicial authorization for use of
the recording device); Osborn, 385 US at 327 (finding tape recording made by government
informant admissible on the ground that "[wie ... deal here not with surreptitious sur-
veillance of a private conversation by an outsider, but.., with the use by one party of a
device to make an accurate record of a conversation about which that party later testi-
fied") (citation omitted).
140 401 US 745 (1971) (plurality opinion).
141 Id at 746-47.
142 Id at 749. See also United States v Caceres, 440 US 741, 750-52 (1979) (following
White).
143 The Court never suggested, however, that assumption-of-risk analysis determines
what constitutes a business record or that assumption-of-risk analysis governs all inter-
actions with third parties.
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the records produced thereby were the bank's records, used by it
in the ordinary course of its business.
Scholars and jurists have questioned whether Miller should
be seen to have "voluntarily" disclosed his records to the bank.144
If one is to "assume" a risk, then certainly there must be a mo-
ment in time when one makes a choice to take that risk and the-
reby to forgo a less risky choice. Yet, one could not conduct bank-
ing without creating records, and one could not easily engage in
modern society without banking. 145 Whether or not the Supreme
Court got it wrong in Miller, it would stretch Hoffa, White, and
similar precedents beyond all recognition to consider that an e-
mail user voluntarily discloses her e-mails and related records to
her ISP, and thereby assumes the risk of disclosure to the gov-
ernment.
Two obvious exceptions present themselves. First, if the ISP
is itself a party to the e-mail, for example when it is the actual
addressee of that e-mail, then it should be considered a party to
the communication. In that case, just as one party to a conversa-
tion assumes the risk that the other party will reveal that com-
munication, an e-mail user should not be able to raise a Fourth
Amendment complaint about the ISP's voluntary disclosures of
those e-mails sent to it. Second, to the extent that the ISP is dis-
closing records of its own business and to the extent that those
records do not concern the customer's own communications, dis-
closure will not implicate the customer's reasonable expectations
of privacy. 146
For an ISP to reveal to the government those e-mails to
which it is not a party would go well beyond Miller and com-
pletely out of range of the original assumption-of-risk cases. We
take up the issue of what these parameters mean in the specific
context of an ISP-user relationship in the next part. For now,
suffice it to say that the precedents, including Miller, do not sup-
port a finding that users assume the risk of disclosure by their
ISPs, unless the ISP itself was an actual party to the communi-
cations disclosed.
144 See, for example, Mulligan, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1580 n 179 (cited in note 120).
145 See sources cited in note 109. See also Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 41
(cited in note 60).
146 We take up the line between communication records and non-communication re-
cords in Part III C.
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3.A clean slate.
We have just argued that Miller does not directly apply to
the case of stored e-mail and that there is good reason not to ex-
tend it to do so. One could argue that the business records cases
have trended towards a rule that deprives stored e-mail of the
protections of the warrant requirement. While we recognize that
argument has some support in the cases, although mostly in dic-
ta, we argue that the business records cases should not be ex-
tended to e-mail stored on an ISP. The absence of precedent es-
tablishing robust Fourth Amendment protection for information
in the hands of third parties may be attributed to several facts
that have no bearing on resolution of the constitutional question.
First, the Fourth Amendment aspects of subpoenas were
long underdeveloped in part because, until the latter part of the
20th century, the Fifth Amendment provided fairly robust pro-
tection in the case of first-party subpoenas. Because the Supreme
Court viewed the compelled production of private documents
from a person to implicate the privilege against self-
incrimination, 147 broad Fourth Amendment protection was un-
necessary.148 Robust Fifth Amendment protection survived until
the case of Fisher v United States149 in 1976.
Second, although it is true that the application of Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment doctrine to third party sub-
poenas never created a sphere of privacy matching that which
147 See Slobogin, 54 DePaul L Rev (cited in note 120) (tracing evolution of Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment doctrine in subpoena law).
148 Nevertheless, in cases dealing with corporate records, the Supreme Court consis-
tently distinguished between corporate records and private documents, suggesting that
the latter were immune from compulsory process. See sources cited in note 120.
149 425 US 391 (1976). In Fisher, the Court evaluated Fifth Amendment challenges to
the IRS's use of summonses demanding that taxpayers' attorneys produce documents
prepared by the taxpayers' accountants. Because of the attorney-client privilege, the
Court analyzed whether the privilege against self-incrimination would have protected the
documents in the taxpayers' hands. Id at 403-05. Rather than inquiring whether the
records in question were private records-the analysis that prior subpoena cases contem-
plated-the Court considered whether the contents of the documents had been created
with government compulsion. The Court reasoned that because a subpoena itself does not
force the creation of the documents the government seeks, any self-incrimination that
occurs by virtue of the documents' disclosure is not "compelled." The Court acknowledged
that the act of producing documents in response to the subpoena may itself sometimes
result in compulsory testimonial incrimination. Id at 410. The Court thus shifted the
focus of the Fifth amendment away from the nature of the documents to the act of produc-
tion. See Slobogin, 54 DePaul L Rev 805 at 821-22 (cited in note 120) (discussing subse-
quent cases); Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amend-
ment Seriously, 73 Va L Rev 1, 6-11 (1987) (describing the Fisher act-of-production
framework).
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applied until the latter part of the twentieth century to first par-
ty subpoenas, 150 that fact is less relevant than it seems. Before
Katz, a property concept of the Fourth Amendment prevailed,
under which Fourth Amendment protection of documents held by
a third party (and in which the third party had a property inter-
est) was highly unlikely. Since Katz, that property-based concep-
tion no longer controls, and courts have recognized that privacy
interests exist independently of property interests. 151
Finally, both before the Court's decision in Katz in 1967 and
between that decision and the Court's decision in Fisher in 1976,
the absence of Fourth Amendment protection mattered the
most-indeed, perhaps mattered only-in cases involving third
parties. But cases involving third parties were comparatively few
in this time period, no doubt because there were far fewer third
party record holders during that time period than there are
now. 152 As other scholars have recognized, the breadth of third
party doctrine becomes increasingly problematic as the quantity
of third party records vastly expands. 153 One reason that courts
should not sanction the government's attempt to export sub-
poena law to stored e-mail is that the dramatic increase in e-mail
storage capacity similarly creates scenarios that the authors of
the subpoena precedents never anticipated. 15 4 Instead, as we
next argue, courts should recognize that stored e-mail and its
related attributes should be protected by a warrant requirement
in the vast majority of cases.
C. Internet Service Providers and Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy
The government claims that even if compelled disclosure of
information in the hands of third parties could sometimes impli-
150 Outside of the attorney-client privilege context, the Court has recognized that the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit use of a subpoena to compel a third party to produce
documents that are later used against the target. See, for example, Johnson v United
States, 228 US 457, 458 (1913) ("A party is privileged from producing evidence but not
from its production.").
151 See Katz, 389 US at 351 (rejecting argument that the Fourth Amendment applies
only in "constitutionally protected areas"; concluding that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places").
152 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person 13-21 (NYU 2004) (providing history of devel-
opment of public-sector and private-sector databases); Mulligan, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at
1585 (cited in note 120).
153 See Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss L
J 139, 167-69 (2005); Solove, The Digital Person at 201-02, 207-08 (cited in note 152).
154 See Bellia, 75 U Chi L Rev 137 (cited in note 20).
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cate the warrant requirement, the typical subscriber-ISP rela-
tionship defeats any expectation of privacy that otherwise might
exist in stored electronic communications. When the government
focuses on the ISP's technical ability to access the contents of
communications or the ISP's reservation of the right to accede to
lawful access, its claims clearly conflict with established Fourth
Amendment law. Arguments concerning the ISP's reservation of
a right to access the contents of users' communications for vari-
ous reasons 155 and its actual screening of the contents of e-mail
for viruses, spain, and child pornography merit more discus-
sion.156 But as we argue next, neither precedents nor the princi-
ples of the Fourth Amendment support the breadth of the gov-
ernment's claim that when a user accedes to an ISP relationship
with these parameters, she forfeits any claim to an expectation of
privacy in her stored communications.
1. Evaluating the government's claims.
a) Technical ability to access communications. As we dis-
cussed earlier, the ISP's mere technical ability to access the con-
tents of communications cannot affect the customer's expectation
of privacy. If it did, Katz would have been wrongly decided, for
the telephone company had the technical ability to access the
contents of the communications at issue in that case. Similarly,
the U.S. Postal Service or a common carrier has the technical
ability to gain access to the contents of a sealed letter or package,
and courts have never held that that fact alone eliminates the
customer's expectation of privacy. 157 Courts have always re-
quired something more.
b)Reserved rights to comply with legal process. We can also
set aside another of the government's claims: that a service pro-
155 Government Proof Brief at *34 (cited in note 77). The government's argument may
be even broader than the claim that ISPs reserve the right to access the contents of com-
munications-that service providers have an unfettered right to access the contents of all
stored communications on their computer systems, regardless of the terms of service. See
id at *47-48. The government bases this conclusion on the fact that the SCA exempts a
service provider from the SCA's prohibition on unlawful access to a communications pro-
vider's system. Here, the government confuses immunity from statutory liability for un-
authorized access under a single statute, the SCA, with blanket immunity for unauthor-
ized access under any other possible state or federal cause of action, such as a state
breach of contract claim for access inconsistent with the terms of the service agreement.
The SCA simply lacks this broad preemptive effect.
156 Id at *49 ("[I]n practice, service providers routinely screen the content of their
users' e-mail. In particular, they check the content of stored e-mail for viruses, spain, and,
increasingly, child pornography.").
157 See note 130 and accompanying text.
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vider's statement in its terms of service that the provider will
comply with legal process itself eliminates the user's Fourth
Amendment claim. 158 E-mail users must be entitled to presume
that agents will present appropriate legal process to obtain
stored e-mails, not that they will present inadequate legal proc-
ess. What process is appropriate of course depends on what the
Fourth Amendment requires and was the very matter in dispute
in Warshak. That question, which is one of constitutional law
and not contract law, must be answered independently of the
provider's commitment to cooperate with the government. Oth-
erwise the government could extinguish an expectation of pri-
vacy simply by choosing to use a form of legal process that is un-
available when an expectation of privacy exists. Moreover, it
would be anomalous to view the ISP customer as having reason
to expect that its ISP will flout the law, let alone assuming the
risk of that.' 59 Certainly courts should, as a normative matter,
credit e-mails users' reasonable expectations that their service
providers will respect constitutional rights. 160
c) Other reserved rights of access and actual screening prac-
tices. The ISP's reservation of a right to access the contents of
users' communications and actual ISP practices present more
complicated questions. Recall Miller's language that one who
"reveals" information to a third party loses any expectation of
privacy in it. Does a subscriber "reveal" her communications to
an ISP by agreeing to circumstances under which an ISP can
access the contents of the communications? Does she "reveal" her
communications if the ISP actually screens their contents?
In arguing that the answers to these last two questions are
both "yes," the government again stretches precedents well be-
yond their reach. Without clear precedents, the question becomes
one of constitutional interpretation. We argue that Fourth
Amendment principles require a much narrower view of the cir-
158 See Government Proof Brief at *34-35 (cited in note 77) ("[B]ecause [a customer]
consents to Yahoo! disclosing her e-mail in response to legal process, compelled disclosure
of e-mail from a Yahoo! account does not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
159 Relatedly, customers of AT&T have brought a class action against the telecommu-
nications giant for disclosing both telephone calls and e-mails to the National Security
Administration in violation of both statutory and constitutional law. See Hepting v
AT&T, 439 F Supp 2d 974 (N D Cal 2006).
160 Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 29-34 (cited in note 60) (arguing that
courts must make a normative judgment about what kind of society we want to live in
and how executive branch surveillance practices fit in). See also White, 401 US at 786
(Harlan dissenting) ("Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflec-
tions of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.").
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cumstances under which a user waives a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and a more analytically precise consideration of the
consequences of such waivers.
As we have discussed throughout, a key question concerns
how to analogize stored e-mails. Under the least protective ap-
proach urged by the government, one could view them as analo-
gous to the banking records at issue in Miller, and as to which
the Supreme Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy.
As we argued above, however, the Miller court considered only
such documents as checks, deposit slips, and account statements
as the records of the bank.161 As the Warshak panel recognized,
some information that ISPs retain about their users, for example
subscriber information, may fit comfortably within the rubric of
the Miller decision. 16 2 As to that information, and because the
ISP has an independent business interest in it, the customer
does not likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy.16 3 If the
ISP chose to turn over that information to the government, or
even were compelled to do so, then the e-mail user would not
likely have a claim. Knowledge that records a business keeps of
its operations may be subject to subpoena is likely widespread
enough that a court should not recognize as reasonable an ISP
customer's claim that it expected such records to be protected by
the warrant requirement.
A crucial question remains: what counts as a record of the
ISP's business and what does not? At the time it drafted the
ECPA in 1986, Congress did not fully consider this issue. Con-
gress determined that communications stored for more than 180
days could be obtained without a warrant, but it is unclear
whether that conclusion rested on the view that such communi-
cations were abandoned or on a view that the communications
constituted records of the provider's business. During the hear-
ings on ECPA, the DOJ argued that communications left on the
161 See Part III B.
162 See Warshak, 490 F3d at 471 ("Compelled disclosure of subscriber information and
related records through the ISP might not undermine the e-mail subscriber's Fourth
Amendment interest ... [because] subscriber information and related records are records
of the service provider as well, and may likely be accessed by ISP employees in the nor-
mal course of their employment.").
163 See, for example, Guest v Leis, 255 F3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir 2001) (internet bulle-
tin board users lost reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information including
subscribers' names, addresses, birthdates, and passwords communicated to bulletin board
system operator); United States v Kennedy, 81 F Supp 2d 1103, 1110 (D Kan 2000) (reject-
ing a privacy interest in subscriber information submitted to ISP); United States v Ham-
brick, 55 F Supp 2d 504, 508-09 (W D Va 1999) (defendant destroyed privacy interest in
subscriber information by conveying it to ISP).
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provider's system for more than 180 days should not be subject to
a warrant requirement, and the House Report accompanying
ECPA acknowledged that a communication kept beyond 180
days "is closer to a regular business record maintained by a third
party and, therefore, deserving of a lesser standard of protec-
tion." 164 The report recognized, however, that providers typically
did not retain messages for longer than a few months165 and that
warrant-level protection in fact applied to a communication long
past the time a subscriber could reasonably expect to retrieve it
from a provider. 166 There is no evidence that Congress recognized
that communications would eventually be stored for more than
180 days as a matter of routine. Similarly, Congress's determina-
tion that remotely stored files could be obtained without a war-
rant apparently rested in part on the view that such files would
constitute business records of the entities engaging the pro-
vider's services, not records of the provider's business. 167
In other words, although the SCA treats electronic commu-
nications stored more than 180 days, or files stored on behalf of
an entity that outsources processing and storage tasks, as more
like the business records at issue in Miller than like the contents
of safe deposit boxes, 168 that treatment does not reflect a con-
gressional determination that the communications or files them-
selves become the records of the provider's business. Even if it
did, more than twenty years later, and with modern practices,
including some web-based systems that encourage users to re-
tain their e-mails forever, 169 that view should no longer hold.
164 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-647, 99th Cong, 2d
Sess 68 (1986).
165 Id ("Most-if not all-electronic communications systems (such as electronic mail
systems), however, only keep copies of messages for a few months. To the extent that the
record is kept beyond that point it is closer to a regular business record maintained by a
third party and, therefore, deserving of a different standard of protection.).
166 See Mulligan, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1572-76 (cited in note 120).
167 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-541, 99th Cong,
2d Sess 10-11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 3564-65 (describing option to process
data offsite and noting that "[tioday businesses of all sizes-hospitals, banks, and many
others-use remote computing services for computer processing"); Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-647, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 23 (1986) (describing
how a subscriber "transmits records" to a remote computing service and distinguishing
between "contents of customer data" and other "records" on the ground that the former
likely enjoy a higher degree of Fourth Amendment protection).
168 See Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 49-50 (cited in note 2) (reviewing the legislative
history).
169 See, for example, Gmail Help Center, Should I archive or delete?, available at
<http://mail.google.comlsupportfbin/answer.py?answer-32608&topic=13286> (last visited
Apr 11, 2008) (informing Gmail service users that they may keep their e-mails indefi-
nitely and recommending that users do so by archiving their messages).
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In our view, the records of an ISP should include only static
information about a user that does not vary as communications
contents and associated attributes do. 170 When the government
acquires subscriber information, for example, it does not obtain
information that covers a period of time, and therefore it engages
in investigative activity that is more like requesting the ISP's
paper records of its business than conducting electronic surveil-
lance. Any inquiry into information about communications that
changes over time should be seen as surveillance-type activity,
and therefore not an inquiry into business records.
Because the question of the constitutional protection of
stored e-mail remains unresolved, the question of where the line
should be drawn around protecting stored e-mail remains unre-
solved as well. We would resolve it by grouping both communica-
tions contents and their associated attributes into a single cate-
gory in which users retain a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and we reject the distinction offered by some courts between
communications contents and non-contents information. 171 First,
we regard those cases as overreading the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Smith v Maryland, 72 which, in 1979, withheld constitu-
tional protection from the telephone numbers detected by a me-
chanical recording device. Smith did not address the vastly
richer information available about modern communications, such
as the identities of the parties, the duration of their communica-
tions, and all of the information associated with web-based com-
munications and use.1 73 Second, we agree with those courts
which have rejected the contents/non-contents dividing line and
which have extended constitutional protection, often as a matter
of state constitutional law, to all communication attributes. 174 In
170 For a discussion of what we mean by communications attributes, which includes
those aspects of communications other than their actual content, see Susan Freiwald,
Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S Cal L
Rev 949 (1996).
171 See, for example, Warshak, 490 F 3d at 470-71, 474.
172 442 US 735 (1979).
173 See Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 46-49 (cited in note 60) (criticizing the
decision in Smith and arguing that it has little to say about modern communications
attributes); Bellia, 75 U Chi L Rev 137 at 174-75 (cited in note 20) (observing that "com-
munication attributes involve a significant move away from the constitutional baseline of
Smith").
174 See, for example, State v Reid, 2008 WL 1774969, *7 (NJ 2008) (finding reasonable
expectation of privacy under New Jersey constitution for subscriber information and
noting that the contents of Internet communications, telephone billing records dialed, and
IP addresses of all sites visited all implicated privacy interests); Coin v Melilli, 521 Pa
405 (1989) (holding that use of pen registers required a prior warrant under state consti-
tution). See also Freiwald, 56 Ala L Rev at 69-71 (cited in note 2) (criticizing derivation of
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short, we view only static, non-communication records to be un-
protected by the warrant requirement.
Besides static, non-communication records, a second cate-
gory of information also proves problematic for e-mail users un-
der constitutional precedents. As we have also discussed, those
communications as to which the ISP is a party fall within the
line of cases concerning confidants. Those precedents, and mod-
ern equivalents involving electronic bulletin boards 175 and chat
rooms, 176 establish that when an e-mail user intentionally sends
an e-mail (or other electronic communication) to another, she
assumes the risk that the intended recipient will disclose that
communication to the government. 177 The Warshak panel also
clearly carved out this scenario as one in which the user's expec-
tation of privacy would not be reasonable. 178 To be clear, these
are cases in which the ISP, as recipient of an intended communi-
cation, acts as a "second party" rather than a third party to a
communication between two others.
Before we move on to the cases in which the ISP acts as a
third party, however, we would argue that courts should be care-
ful when they consider the implications of disclosure to a second
party ISP. Cases have held that those who communicate with
another have no claim when that other party voluntarily dis-
closes the communication to another. 179 That voluntary disclo-
sure is within the set of risks that the first party assumes. And
they have held that the first party lacks standing to contest the
manner in which the second party is made to hand over the
communication in those cases in which the government must
compel the second party to disclose. 80 But the cases do not say
that the second party, here the ISP, lacks its own standing to
assert a Fourth Amendment right of privacy in the communica-
tion-in other words to refuse to disclose the communication
without a warrant. And they do not establish that the first party
user should expect, or assume, that the government will violate
contents/non-contents split).
175 Leis, 255 F3d at 330.
176 United States v Charbonneau, 979 F Supp 1177, 1184-85 (S D Ohio 1997); State v
Evers, 815 A2d 432, 439-40 (NJ 2003).
177 See Charbonneau, 979 F Supp at 1184-85 (relying in part on Hoffa in concluding
that chat room user lacked expectation of privacy in messages, where undercover agents
were participants in chat room).
178 See Warshak, 490 F3d at 470-71.
179 See Part III B 2.
180 See Miller, 425 US at 445 (concluding that target "possessed no Fourth Amend-
ment interest that could be vindicated by a challenge to the subpoenas.').
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the rights of the second party ISP by compelling disclosure with-
out obtaining a warrant if the second party does assert its own
Fourth Amendment claims.
It should be easy to understand why this scenario has not
yet presented itself to a court. The question of the ISP's rights
would arise only if the government compelled the ISP to disclose
its actual communications with a customer and the ISP asserted
its own Fourth Amendment claim. The customer's reasonable
expectation of privacy in that scenario would be an issue only if
the customer were somehow able to overcome her lack of Fourth
Amendment standing. Nonetheless, careful consideration of this
scenario, and of the precedents that govern, indicates a useful
rule for actual third party cases: a user does not forfeit her
Fourth Amendment rights merely because there is another party
to the communication. Katz, for one, and the entire electronic
surveillance statutory structure, rest on the recognition that two-
party communications may be private and that the parties to
them may expect the government to follow the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment in obtaining access to them.
With that in mind, we now turn to the cases in which the
government seeks neither communications to which the ISP is a
party, nor static, non-communication records of the ISP's busi-
ness, in which it retains an independent interest and which do
not implicate the user's reasonable expectations of privacy. In
other words, does a user's granting of access to an ISP to her
communications with others lead the user to forfeit an expecta-
tion of privacy vis-A-vis that ISP, and if so, what does that mean
for government access?
We first return to the proper analogy for the information at
issue. These are neither static, non-communication business re-
cords nor communications to which the ISP is an actual party,
but rather communications and attributes created when the tar-
get communicates with others, and to which the ISP obtains
some access. As we have discussed, we view the best analogy for
this scenario as the cases in which a third party carries, trans-
ports, or stores property for another. In those cases, as in the
stored e-mail case, the customer grants access to the ISP because
it is essential to the customer's interests. Someone cannot send a
letter or package without engaging an intermediary-the postal
service or package service-to do the actual transporting. But
one does not engage the third party because one wants the in-
termediary to have access; that access is a required means of ef-
fectuating the customer's interests. The same can be said of the
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user of a storage locker, a rental property, or a safe deposit box.
The customer's interest in making use of the service necessitates
the involvement of the third party. Of course, the same may be
said of the ISP customer; she engages with the ISP out of the
desire to use its intermediary services.
In all cases, the third party intermediaries retain rights of
access to protect their own property and to provide their own
services. As we have discussed, in all the analogous cases, the
law has clearly required that the government procure a warrant
before demanding access to those items carried, transported, or
stored. 81 That is because the law has recognized that permitting
access to an intermediary who needs such access to provide his
service or protect his property has no bearing on one's reasonable
expectations of privacy vis-i-vis the government. 8 2 The same
must apply for users of ISPs. The contrary notion that users for-
feit all expectations of privacy by virtue of permitting access to
ISPs to protect their business and property is both counter-
intuitive and in conflict with Fourth Amendment law.' 83 To be
clear, users may lack a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to those third party intermediaries who discover informa-
tion in the course of exercising their rightful access to the users'
packages, storage lockers, rental properties, or stored e-mail ac-
counts. 184
181 See notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
182 See, for example, Stoner, 376 US at 489 ("It is important to bear in mind that it
was the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night
clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by
word or deed, either directly or through an agent. It is true that the night clerk clearly
and unambiguously consented to the search. But there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been author-
ized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner's room.").
183 See id at 489-90 (finding defendant to have retained Fourth Amendment claim
against warrantless search despite hotel clerk's consent and rights of access); Chapman,
365 US at 616-18 (holding that home owner's putative right to enter rental premises to
view waste did not give it permission to authorize law enforcement warrantless search for
evidence of a crime).
184 In addition, a customer who fails to pay or to remove property at the end of a defi-
nite term, or who violates the agreement with the third party may have so altered the
relationship with the third party as to have forfeited his right to rely on the fact that the
intermediary will not turn over that property to the government. See, for example, United
States v Poulsen, 41 F3d 1330, 1336-37 (9th Cir 1994) (holding that renter of storage unit
loses expectation of privacy when he fails to pay rent, and facility manager may seize
property and turn it over to law enforcement); United States v Rahme, 813 F2d 31, 34-35
(2d Cir 1987) (holding that where hotel guest failed to pay rent and rental period expired,
hotel could lawfully take possession of items in room and guest had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy). The case of United States v Young, 350 F3d 1302 (11th Cir 2003),
would seem to go further. There the court held that a warrantless search was constitu-
tional because the defendant failed to adhere to Fed-Ex's clear contractual requirement
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That implies that if the third party chooses to disclose the in-
formation so discovered to the government without requiring a
warrant, the user cannot complain. When the user assumed the
risk that the intermediary would discover incriminating informa-
tion or property in the course of its business, she also assumed
the risk that the intermediary would choose to turn that infor-
mation over to the government. If the user mistakenly trusted
the intermediary to protect its incriminating information, there
is no reason for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced
trust. 18 5 Importantly, however, permitting the third party access
to one's property or communications does not mean that one ac-
cedes to unlawful acquisition by the government. In those cases
when the relationship with the third party is intact and when
the third party chooses not to disclose information to the gov-
ernment but instead resists, the government must proceed to get
a warrant. 186 There is no reason to construe the user's assump-
tion of the risk that the intermediary will discover incriminating
information in the course of its proper access as the assumption
of the risk that the government will compel the ISP that resists
to produce that information without following the proper proce-
dures. 187
While thus far we have been discussing ISPs that provide
services to the public, we should note that our analysis extends
as well to private ISPs, such as employers and educational insti-
tutions who provide e-mail to employees and other constituen-
cies. Because of the nature of the employment or educational en-
vironment, private ISPs likely enjoy greater access to users of
their e-mail systems. 188 That, in turn, means that they will likely
not to ship cash, and Fed-Ex retained the right to search all packages without limit. In its
discussion, however, the court did not say that consent to search alone would be suffi-
cient, and it noted that the precedents required both violation of contract terms and that
the search was not instigated by the government. Id at 1305-08.
185 See note 139 and accompanying text. See also White, 401 US at 749 (holding that a
defendant has no "justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that a person
with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police").
Whether this rule should apply in the ISP context is beyond the scope of this Article, but
certainly not beyond question.
186 See, for example, United States v Barry, 673 F2d 912, 915-18 (6th Cir 1982) (dis-
tinguishing between cases in which the carrier originated the disclosure to the govern-
ment and those in which the carrier was asked, and therefore acted as an agent of the
government).
187 The argument for this is the same for the argument that granting an ISP the right
to respond to lawful access cannot be the same thing as granting the ISP the right to
respond to access that violates the constitution. See Part III C 1 b.
188 Employees' e-mails may provide an indication, for example, of how employees treat
the company's customers, of whether employees are sharing proprietary information with
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have more opportunity to uncover incriminating information.
Just as with public ISPs, however, such private ISPs may not be
compelled to turn over information so uncovered without the
proper procedure of a warrant.18 9 Unless the information they
discover is a static, non-communication record of their business,
or a communication to which the ISP itself is a party, the stored
e-mail's sender or recipient enjoys the protections of the warrant
requirement.
Finally, there are at least two ways in which the government
may wrongfully try to compel disclosure by an ISP, public or pri-
vate. One is to issue a subpoena or related court order for infor-
mation that the ISP has discovered in the course of its own right-
ful access to the communications of its users. Another is to use a
subpoena or related court order to compel an ISP to disclose a
greater amount of information on the grounds that it could have
discovered the information itself in the course of its exercise of
its lawful access. The second scenario, which more closely resem-
bles the government's actions in the Warshak investigation, is no
more defensible than the first. 190 When the ISP proceeds in re-
sponse to a court order or subpoena, or even at the request of the
government, it acts as an agent of the government and the scope
of its private access to its users' e-mails should play no role in
the constitutional analysis. 191
2. Summary.
We have argued that the government may compel disclosure
of information from an ISP without obtaining a probable-cause
warrant only when it seeks the ISP's static, non-communication
records of its business or information pertaining to the ISP's own
outsiders, and of whether employees are properly using their time in the office.
189 In this context, consider O'Connor v Ortega, 480 US 709, 721-23 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (recognizing, in a case involving a government employer, the need to distinguish
between searches for work-related purposes and searches for evidence of criminal mis-
conduct, and subjecting only the former to a reasonableness requirement).
190 See, for example, Stoner, 376 US at 489-90 (holding that a warrant was needed
because agents asked hotel clerk for entry to defendant's room); Chapman, 365 US at
616-18 (holding that agents needed a warrant when they asked property owner's permis-
sion to enter renter's house with the purpose of investigating crime).
191 See Long, 64 MJ at 65 (in context of search of e-mails by military employer, distin-
guishing a prior case in which "incriminating e-mail evidence was found inadvertently by
personnel performing routine systems maintenance" and concluding that "evidence seized
in this case was [seized] as a part of a search for law enforcement purposes'). For other
cases distinguishing private searches from government searches, see, for example, United
States v Jarrett, 338 F3d 339 (4th Cir 2003); United States v Steiger, 318 F3d 1039, 1045-
46 (11th Cir 2003); United States v Runyan, 275 F3d 449, 456 (5th Cir 2001).
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communications. For access to all other information, though the
ISP may choose to disclose the information to which it has access
without violating a user's reasonable expectation of privacy, it
may not be compelled to do so unless the government first ob-
tains a warrant based on probable cause. 192 The provider's tech-
nical ability to access communications and the provider's an-
nouncement that it will comply with legal process are clearly ir-
relevant. The provider's rights to protect its own property and to
prevent misuse of its services limit the conditions under which
the user may allege that the provider has violated his privacy
rights, but do nothing to reduce the government's obligation un-
der the Fourth Amendment to acquire a warrant before it either
demands access to what the ISP has discovered or demands that
the ISP conduct a new search in aid of the government's own in-
vestigative mission.
D. Comparison of the Warshak Panel's Approach
1. Reasonable expectations of privacy in ISP relationships.
In the course of its decision, the Warshak panel described
three possible scenarios under which users may in fact waive
their reasonable expectations of privacy in those e-mails they
store with third party ISPs. 193 Our analysis arrives at roughly
the same conclusion as to the first scenario but differs as to the
second and third.
In the first scenario, a third party may disclose those e-mails
to which it is a party. 194 We agree that such a conclusion follows
from the Hoffa/White line of cases, but emphasize again that a
third party's right to disclose e-mails does not equate to the gov-
ernment's right to compel such disclosure without a warrant. It
is axiomatic that a government agent cannot open a sealed letter
without a warrant while it is being carried by the United States
Postal service, while the letter's ultimate recipient is free to dis-
close it to the government without restriction. 195
192 See Part IV B for our discussion of whether a wiretap order may be required in-
stead.
193 The ISP is a third party in that the sender of the e-mail is the first party and the
recipient is the second party.
194 Warshak, 490 F3d at 475. As discussed above, the ISP is actually the second party
to the communication. See text accompanying notes 178-80.
195 Compare Ex parte Jackson, 96 US at 733 (holding that letters and packages sent
through the mail guarded by same protection from government search and seizure as
though they were retained by the sender and recipient in their homes) with White, 401
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In the second scenario, the panel recognized that ISPs may
disclose to law enforcement agents those attributes of communi-
cations to which they retain access in the ordinary course of their
business. While it is unclear exactly to which attributes the pan-
el was referring, the panel made clear that the contents of e-
mails could not be so disclosed. 196 To the extent that the panel
was discussing the static, non-communication records of the ISP,
such as the "subscriber information"'197 to which it referred ex-
plicitly, we feel compelled to agree, based on Miller. But we dis-
agree with the panel's approach to the extent that it is meant to
apply to the other communication attributes to which ISPs have
access. We view those other communications attributes, along
with their associated communications, to be protected against
compelled disclosure by the warrant requirement.
In the panel's third scenario, ISPs may disclose those e-
mails to which their agreements with users grant them "total
access. ' 198 While the panel recognized the conceptual question as
whether "the challenger has ... maintained an expectation of
privacy with respect to the individual being compelled to make
the disclosure," 99 we believe that it misapprehended the impli-
cations of ISP access. As we have just discussed, when stored e-
mail users lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in informa-
tion to which the ISP has proper access, they lose the right to
complain about the ISP's voluntary disclosure of that informa-
tion. But they do not assume the risk that the government will
compel the ISP, without a warrant, to turn over information,
whether or not the ISP actually obtained access to that informa-
tion in the course of its business.
2. Raising Fourth Amendment claims.
Our disagreement with some of the Warshak panel's find-
ings leads us to specify exactly how we believe a court should
respond when presented with a question as to the Fourth
Amendment status of stored e-mail. Our approach, while quite
US at 749 (holding that recipients of communication may disclose contents of the com-
munication to the government without violating the sender's Fourth Amendment rights).
196 Warshak, 490 F3d at 473-74.
197 Id at 471.
198 Id at 475.
199 Id at 469 (casting the "critical question" as whether "an e-mail user maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails vis-A-vis the party who is subject to com-
pelled disclosure-in this instance, the ISPs.").
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similar to the procedure outlined by the Warshak panel, differs
in a few important respects.
The Warshak panel indicated that the government could ob-
tain a warrant to compel an ISP to disclose the e-mails it stores
for its users. We agree with that approach for all information
other than the static, non-communication records of the ISP's
business, though we consider, in the next part, whether it would
make more sense for a court to demand an order that meets the
Fourth Amendment requirements for electronic surveillance set
forth in Berger.200
The panel also indicated that the government could bypass
the need for a warrant and proceed under a subpoena when it
establishes to a reviewing court's satisfaction that the ISP has
extinguished its user's expectation of privacy in her communica-
tions by (a) explicitly reserving the right to monitor (b) the con-
tents of communications and (c) exercising that right in the ordi-
nary course of its business.20 1
We do not agree that such a showing would entitle the gov-
ernment to proceed by subpoena or equivalent court order. As
discussed, the nature of the ISP's access to its users' communica-
tions is relevant to the users' potential privacy or contract claims
against the ISP. That access may also imply that the user lacks a
Fourth Amendment claim when an ISP, pursuant to lawful ac-
cess, obtains incriminating information and chooses to disclose it
to the government. But ISP access does not mean that the gov-
ernment may either compel the ISP to disclose non-static com-
munications information it has found or ask the ISP to gather
information without first obtaining a warrant based on probable
cause.
Besides being more in keeping with the principles of the
Fourth Amendment and the precedents, our approach dramati-
cally reduces the need for a detailed, fact-based inquiry. The
question for a reviewing court is whether the ISP acted inde-
pendently of the government in turning over the pertinent in-
formation. If not, a warrant, at least, is clearly required. If so,
further inquiry into the nature of the ISP's privacy violation
would be necessary only to evaluate the user's claims against the
ISP. Since it should be relatively straightforward to determine
whether the ISP volunteered the information at issue or the gov-
200 388 US at 55-60 (discussing the heightened need for particularity and other safe-
guards in the context of electronic surveillance).
201 Warshak, 490 F3d at 473-74.
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ernment compelled disclosure, there will be little need for indi-
vidual hearings. In addition, to the extent the SCA permits com-
pelled disclosure without a prior warrant, it is clearly unconsti-
tutional.
Finally, the panel indicated that the government may avoid
obtaining a prior warrant or making the showing above if it in-
stead provides the target with notice and an opportunity to be
heard.20 2 During that hearing, the target must be entitled to
raise the claim that warrantless compelled disclosure of her e-
mails and related attributes would violate her Fourth Amend-
ment rights. It is difficult to imagine why the government would
shoulder any lesser burden, 20 3 unless one accepted the argument
that compelled disclosure merits only reasonableness review (in-
dependent of the target's reasonable expectation of privacy),
which is a view we have refuted. 204
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND
GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES
A. Unifying the SCA's Procedural Hurdles
As we discussed in Part I A, the DOJ has proffered a confus-
ing set of statutory interpretations that have construed the SCA
to impose minimal procedural burdens on government investiga-
tors. As we discussed, under the DOJ's scheme, the procedural
hurdles for access to stored e-mails vary based on how long the e-
mails have been stored, whether they have been downloaded or
accessed, and with what type of service provider they reside.
Recall that the DOJ views a significant category of stored e-
mails as lacking any of the protections of SCA and regards a tiny
category of stored e-mails as entitled to the protections of the
warrant requirement. In particular, the DOJ claims the right to
acquire any opened, accessed, or downloaded e-mails stored on
corporate or university computers without adhering to the SCA
in any way. 20 5 It says it may acquire those e-mails that have
202 See note 85 (providing conflicting statements of the Warshak panel) and note 52
(providing district court language that is consistent with our argument).
203 See Orin Kerr, Warshak and Fourth Amendment Standards for Orders to Compel,
available at <http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_06_24-2007_06_30.shtml#1182840
096> (last visited Apr 11, 2008) (interpreting panel decision to suggest that "the Fourth
Amendment requires probable cause or notice, but the presence of notice drops the re-
quired legal threshold down to reasonableness" but criticizing that suggestion).
204 See Part III A.
205 DOJ Search Manual at 89 (cited in note 19) (describing how the "ECPA no longer
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been opened or otherwise accessed on an ISP that provides ser-
vice to the public using a subpoena or related court order pursu-
ant to § 2703(d). Only those e-mails that are neither drafts nor
copies of sent e-mails, and that have been residing 180 days or
less without being opened, accessed, or downloaded, require a
probable cause warrant to acquire. 20 6 In addition to imposing
only minimal constraints on government agents before they ob-
tain stored e-mails, the SCA provides no statutory exclusionary
remedy 20 7 and offers limited civil remedies 208 to victims of those
investigations that fail to satisfy the minimal protections it im-
poses.
The recognition that the Fourth Amendment regulates gov-
ernment access to stored e-mails and their attributes implies a
much simpler scheme, and one that provides much higher proce-
dural hurdles and significant remedies. As discussed above,
Fourth Amendment questions arise only when the government
requests disclosure instead of the ISP volunteering it. Then, the
focus must be on distinguishing between static, non-
communication records of the ISP, to which the subpoena stan-
dard applies, and everything else. For everything else, the gov-
ernment must acquire a warrant based on probable cause, at
least. Failure to adhere to that constitutional minimum necessi-
tates the availability of a suppression remedy as to all evidence
acquired from the ISP or derived from that evidence. 20 9 The
Fourth Amendment analysis does not depend on how long the
information has been stored because the analysis concerns
whether the government's inquiry covers a period of time and not
when that period of time occurred. 210 Similarly, there is no con-
regulates access" to an e-mail retrieved from a company provider of e-mail). See also id at
89 ("Functionally speaking, the opened e-mail ... drops out of the ECPA.").
206 Id at 95-99. Even for those, the DOJ claims that it does not need to give notice to
the target, although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require such notice. The
DOJ manual claims that the "search warrant obviates the need to give notice to the sub-
scriber," but for that proposition it cites only a provision of the statute that does not in
fact apply to the category of communications discussed in the text. See id at 98 (citing 18
USC § 2703(b)(1)(A)).
207 See 18 USC § 2708 (2000) (limiting remedies to those provided by statute and not
providing suppression remedy for stored records, no matter how acquired).
208 The USA PATRIOT Act raised the civil recovery from $1,000 to $10,000 but pre-
cluded attorneys' fees awards and limited recovery to cases in which victims establish
"willful" violations. See 18 USC § 2712 (2000 & Supp IV 2004).
209 See, for example, State v Reid, 2008 WL 1774969, *10-11 (NJ 2008) (granting a
suppression remedy for subscriber information obtained without meeting constitutional
requisites); Commonwealth v Melilli, 521 Pa 405 (1989) (granting suppression remedy for
evidence gathered by pen register without a warrant).
210 Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 74-75 (cited in note 60) (making the dis-
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stitutional basis for reducing the procedural hurdles imposed on
demands for e-mails because they are stored on systems that do
not provide e-mail to the public. As we discussed above, employ-
ers likely engage in monitoring practices that afford their em-
ployees a lower expectation of privacy vis-6-vis their employers
in their stored information than users of public systems. But
that means only that the employer or university will have access
to more information that it may choose to disclose to the govern-
ment without violating the user's rights. But whatever the scope
of the private ISP's access to users' stored communications, that
has no bearing on the government's ability to compel disclosure.
Therefore, whenever the government seeks an ISP's communica-
tion records instead of its static, non-communication, records the
government must acquire a warrant, no matter what the ISP's
status.
Finally, warrant-level protection for stored e-mail should
persist whether or not an e-mail has been opened, accessed, or
downloaded. It is hard to imagine why the act of reading or pre-
paring to read an e-mail, which is the entire point of communi-
cating by e-mail, should somehow deprive a user of his reason-
able expectation of privacy in the electronic communication. As
discussed, the government's distinctions on this basis derive
from a strained reading of out-of-date statutory provisions, and
neither reflect nor should impact the Fourth Amendment status
of stored e-mail.
In conclusion, Fourth Amendment protection for stored e-
mail does not hinge on arcane terms embedded in the SCA nor
the DOJ's tortured interpretations of those terms. The Warshak
panel recognized this by failing to use any of the categories just
described in its analysis. 211 Constitutional protection for stored
e-mail brings much needed simplicity to the scheme of electronic
communications privacy. It also requires much more protection
than the DOJ interprets the SCA to provide. To the extent that
the SCA provides less than a warrant requirement as the proce-
dural hurdle to access stored e-mail and attributes not consid-
ered to be a static, non-communication record of the ISP, it must
be struck down.
tnction between static information and investigations that cover a period of time).
211 The Warshak panel's injunction said nothing about the duration of the constitu-
tional protection or whether the e-mail had been opened, downloaded, or otherwise ac-
cessed. Warshak, 490 F3d at 475. It also noted that its analysis applied to e-mails stored
on private ISP's as well as public. See id at 473.
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B. Procedural Requirements: Wiretap Order or Warrant?
As we briefly noted in the introduction, the procedural hur-
dles imposed on government agents who seek a wiretap to inter-
cept telephone conversations are more burdensome than those
imposed on agents who seek a traditional search warrant to
search a home. Courts have granted targets of electronic surveil-
lance technologies the highest level of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection by imposing significantly more stringent restraints on
government agents than that imposed by the warrant require-
ment. In Berger, the Supreme Court found the Fourth Amend-
ment to require that agents use wiretapping and eavesdropping
as a last resort, strictly limit the duration of their investigations,
and minimize the collection of non-incriminating communica-
tions. 212 An important procedural question that follows from
treating the government's acquisition of stored e-mail as a
Fourth Amendment search is: should the protections afforded
wiretapping apply or should a traditional probable-cause war-
rant apply?
We have already made what we view as the best argument
for applying the same heightened protection accorded to tele-
phone calls to stored e-mail surveillance. 213 As the Warshak pan-
el recognized, e-mail is the modern day analog of a telephone
conversation. Accordingly, the compelled disclosure of stored e-
mail accounts has the potential to be as hidden, continuous, in-
discriminate, and intrusive as wiretapping and video surveil-
lance. 214 At the same time, Congress has distinguished between
information in electronic storage and information acquired in
real time, and has accorded the former less protection. 21 5 The
question is whether that distinction, made as a matter of policy
in 1986, holds up as a matter of constitutional law today.
In fact, there are good arguments for holding the compelled
disclosure of stored e-mail to a simple probable cause-based war-
rant. 21 6 There are several ways in which, depending on the na-
ture of the investigation, the compelled disclosure of stored e-
mail and its attributes could actually be less hidden, continuous,
212 Berger, 388 US at 58-60.
213 See note 60 and accompanying text.
214 See Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 61-72 (cited in note 60); Freiwald, 56
Ala L Rev at 81 (cited in note 2).
215 See note 2.
216 See, for example, Solove, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1298-1303 (cited in note 74) (ad-
vocating a warrant for online surveillance).
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indiscriminate, and intrusive. First of all, if the target is given
prior notice of the disclosure order, and the chance to contest it
before it is executed, then the investigative tool would no longer
be hidden. To the extent agents must meet the particularity re-
quirement and compel disclosure only of those stored e-mails for
which they have probable cause, the indiscriminate and intru-
sive nature of the surveillance may be reduced if the ISP pro-
duces only those e-mails and related attributes that are particu-
larly specified. Similarly, if agents substantially limit the period
over which the e-mails and attributes they seek were sent and
received, and particularly if they limit their inquiry to one mo-
ment in time, then the investigation would seem less continuous
than wiretapping. In fact, as we have argued, one may analogize
stored e-mail searches to a search for first class letters, which
are regulated by the warrant requirement but not by the height-
ened wiretap requirements. Second, one can analogize such
searches to the searches of stored containers, as the Warshak
panel did. Those are also subject only to a warrant based on
probable cause.
All in all, if a simple search warrant is used along with pro-
cedures that minimize the problematic qualities of stored e-mail
surveillance, it is possible that process would suffice to meet con-
stitutional requirements. 217 However, if the government seeks
stored e-mail or its attributes covering a period of time, and if
the breadth of the request makes it indiscriminate, stored e-mail
surveillance could merit the application of a wiretap court order.
Stored e-mail surveillance can be significantly more intrusive
than a traditional wiretap. Depending on whether, and, if so,
when, the target receives notice and an opportunity to be heard,
stored e-mail surveillance may be equally as hidden.
Whether a wiretap order or a traditional search warrant is
required, targets of improper investigations must have the bene-
fit of a suppression remedy. That requirement is, of course, man-
dated by constitutional doctrine. In addition, the incentive to
bring a constitutional challenge, which accompanies the exclu-
sionary rule, will mean more cases and more opportunities to
refine the doctrine as necessary to reflect new circumstances
and, undoubtedly, new technologies. 218
217 Freiwald, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev 3 at 74 (cited in note 60).
218 The numerous challenges to wiretapping investigations have helped to define the
constitutionally permissible parameters of that practice.
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CONCLUSION
E-mail users generally retain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the e-mails and related attributes stored on their ISPs' com-
puters. Fourth Amendment precedents support that conclusion..
The DOJ's arguments to the contrary rely on misunderstandings
of the precedents and ultimately on normative arguments that
are unpersuasive. Once courts recognize a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in stored e-mail, as the Warshak panel did in the
Sixth Circuit, they will bring the constitutional protection of
modern electronic communications in line with analogous tradi-
tional media. According warrant-level protection for stored e-
mail requires courts to construe the SCA's warrant requirement
to apply to virtually all stored e-mail or to invalidate the SCA to
the extent that such a construction is impossible. Either way, it
provides both a dramatic simplification in the statutory law and
meaningful judicial oversight of modern surveillance practices.

